Wednesday, July 23, 2008

Alistair on Liturgy

Why liturgy?



Why liturgy?

So that I can learn how to speak; and pray; and praise.

So that I can be taught the truth.

So that I can be shaped by the church; so that I can be made into a disciple.

"When you pray, do this...."

"Do this, in remembrance..."

So that the centre of gravity does not lie in my own feelings and vocabulary but in the expression of the church.

It is not important how I feel when I say 'Glory be to the Father...'; nor is it important how wholeheartedly I believe what I say. It is a question of obedience - feelings and thought will ebb and flow in my life, but the persistence of discipleship is primarily manifested through obedience.

There are times of walking in the desert. There are also times of entry into the promised land. The point is to maintain the faith and trust in the pillar of fire and pillar of cloud, whether it is day or night within me.

Liturgy assumes a) that I don't yet know all that I need to know about Christianity, and b) that the church has learnt some of what it needs to know about Christianity. Liturgy is how that learning is passed on, and developed.

Liturgy is properly pluriform, fluid, and evolutionary.

Liturgy is a whole body activity; when done correctly, liturgy is also an ecstatic, out-of-body activity.

There is no greater tyranny than the tyranny of choice. I need to fall in with something that is more important than my own perspectives, within which I can find myself. Anything that I feel competent to choose is automatically diminished by that assessment.

Liturgy is the spacious room in which the Lord has set my feet.

Liturgy is mystery.

The Cross and the Caricatures

Article URL: http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/page.cfm?ID=205

The Cross and the Caricatures 1
The Cross and the Caricatures

a response to Robert Jenson, Jeffrey John, and a new volume
entitled Pierced for Our Transgressions

Eastertide, 2007

by the Bishop of Durham, Dr N. T. Wright


Introduction

About ten days before Easter, the question of the cross suddenly impinged on me from two different
directions. Late one night, I read an article on the atonement by the leading American Lutheran
theologian, Robert Jenson; the next day I had a telephone call from the Sunday Telegraph, asking
me to comment on a forthcoming radio talk by the Dean of St Albans, the Very Revd Dr Jeffrey
John. Both of them – to say nothing of other discussions I find myself in from time to time, and of
course the question of the pastoral and evangelistic meaning of the cross within the course of a busy
ministry – made me realise I ought to try to say something further on the subject. My resolve in this
direction has been stiffened, this last week, by reading a new book entitled Pierced for Our
Transgressions by three authors connected with Oak Hill College in London (details below). This
essay cannot be a full discussion of all the relevant matters; that would take a substantial book. It is
one small step in the direction of putting down some markers for the ongoing debate.

But only a small step. I am under no illusions that, even if I were to write a thousand pages on the
subject, I would ever exhaust it. In any case, I am one of those who think it good that the church
has never formally defined ‘the atonement’, partly because I firmly believe that when Jesus himself
wanted to explain to his disciples what his forthcoming death was all about, he didn’t give them a
theory, he gave them a meal. Of course, the earliest exponent of that meal (Paul, in 1 Corinthians)
insists that it matters quite a lot that you understand what you are about as you come to share in it;
but still it is the meal, not the understanding, that is the primary vehicle of meaning. What is more,
I happen to believe, as a reader of the New Testament, that all the great ‘theories’ about atonement
do indeed have roots there, and that the better we understand the apostolic testimony the better we
see how they fit together.


1. Robert Jenson: Which Story Does ‘Atonement’ Belong In?

Be that as it may. I found the article by Jenson (like much of his work) very stimulating (‘On the
Doctrine of the Atonement’, in Reflections [Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton], vol 9, Spring
2007, pp2–13). His main point is that standard theories of atonement (of how, in other words,
Jesus’ death effected our reconciliation with God) have located the cross within conceptualities and
narratives other than the biblical one, to which the gospel writers and Paul all point as the proper
matrix for understanding the event (‘Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures’).
Anselm cut the cross loose from its scriptural moorings and placed it within a feudal system of
honour and shame; Abelard, within a story of a divine teaching programme; the Greek Fathers,
within the world of mythical satanic powers. None of these is without biblical resonance, but equally
none grapples with the actual story the biblical writers tell, and the way in which the gospel writers
in particular present the meaning of Jesus’ death primarily through a narrative, a narrative which
offers itself not just as an echo of bits and pieces of the ancient scriptures of Israel, but as the
continuation of that story and the bringing of it to its climax. (This last way of putting it is my own;
it is, in effect, a summary of the third chapter of my recent book Evil and the Justice of God (SPCK,
2006); but is I think true to what Jenson was arguing.) Unfortunately (from this point of view),
Jenson’s own positive proposal seems to me merely to propose another story, this time a
theologian’s analysis of the work of the three persons of the Trinity, which, though it is I believe
intimately related to the story the biblical writers tell, yet appears to pay scant attention to (for
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The Cross and the Caricatures 2
example) the narratives of creation and fall, of the call of Abraham, of the exodus, the conquest, the
monarchy, the exile and restoration, and so on. Jenson is clearly aware of this problem. I suspect
that the article is a ‘taster’ for a book Jenson is still to publish, in which he will work it all out in
proper detail.

All of this I pondered as I read the article late at night; and it prepared me, in a way I had not
expected, for the telephone call the next day from the Sunday Telegraph. The reporter told me that
the Dean of St Albans was about to give a talk on Radio 4 denying one of the traditional
interpretations of the cross. I refused to make any comment until the reporter had read me
substantial sections of the talk; having now read the full text I have of course seen more of the
nuances in it, but there is no reason to retract what I said then, which was (a) that the Dean
seemed to be rejecting a caricature of the biblical doctrine in question, (b) that this rejection was
bound to be heard as a rejection of the doctrine itself, and (c) that it was a shame for the BBC to be
highlighting this kind of thing in the middle of Holy Week. One or two other bishops, I gather, said
similar things. There the matter might have rested. I commented briefly on the controversy in my
sermon to diocesan clergy on Maundy Thursday, and encouraged them to embrace, and preach, the
genuine biblical doctrine, while avoiding both the caricature and the rejection of the caricature as if
it were the reality (see http://www.ntwrightpage.com/sermons/Word_Cross.htm).


2. Jeffrey John: Caricaturing the Cross

Now, it seems, the fuss has itself become news. The Church Times carried an article (13 April 2007,
p5) describing how Dr John has received abusive hate mail (well, we all get that), and a silly
headline (‘Christ did not die for our sins’; well, we all get silly headlines too, and they are not usually
written by the reporter). And in a letter published in the same issue of the paper, he protests that
he is simply following the line taken by the 1995 Doctrine Commission report, The Mystery of
Salvation, which itself at this point follows the famous 1938 Commission.

I am glad, of course, that Dr John gives such a high value to such reports – higher, perhaps, than
the authors themselves would have done; speaking as one of the authors of the 1995 Report, I
would say that it represented a complex conversation frozen in a moment of time rather than a
definitive conclusion. But he might perhaps have looked closer. The Mystery of Salvation notes that
substitutionary atonement is taught in the Thirty-Nine Articles, and that this enshrines ‘a vital truth’,
which can best be got at through the language of ‘vicarious’ suffering (p212). And, while perfectly
properly emphasizing that the ultimate subject of the action in the death of Jesus is God himself
(presumably God the Father), the Report notes (p213), immediately after the passage quoted from
the 1938 Report to which Dr John refers (‘the notion of propotiation as the placating by man of an
angry God is definitely unChristian’), that ‘it is nevertheless true that in Paul’s thought the effect of
expiation is the same as that of propitiation – to neutralise the sin that is the cause of God’s
displeasure and so to avert God’s wrath (however that should be understood).’ While noting the
obvious problems with a crude doctrine of propitiation (a loving Jesus placating a malevolent God),
the Report goes on to point out (p214) that both Athanasius and Augustine, as well as Calvin, spoke
in terms of God himself providing the propitiation for his own wrath. The problem of the crude
formulation was, in other words, already well known in the Greek and Latin Fathers, and this did not
prevent them from continuing to see Jesus’ death in terms of propitiation even while insisting that
the work from start to finish was the result of God’s love. Granted, the 1995 Report does scant
justice to the history of the idea of substitution, both penal and otherwise, giving the bizarre
impression that the idea was merely invented by Anselm and developed by Calvin, as though it were
not also to be found in several of the Fathers, a good many of the mediaeval writers, and more or
less all the Reformers, not least Martin Luther. But that is only to say that the Report, like all such
productions, should not be taken as a definitive account either of what Anglicans are supposed to
believe or of what they believe in fact.

We might also note that the 1995 Report had also spoken, earlier, of Jesus as having ‘died our
death, sharing our failure, condemnation, despair and godforsakenness’ (p103, italics added). Earlier
again, and more fully (and answering in a measure to Jenson’s request for the story of the cross to
be more biblically rooted), the Report stated:
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The Cross and the Caricatures 3

In going to the cross, Jesus acted out his own version of the total story, according to which
Israel, represented by himself, must be the people in and through whom the creator God would
deal with the evil of the world and of humankind. The cross, as the execution of Israel’s Messiah
outside Jerusalem at the hands of the pagans, was thus the great summation of Israel’s exile,
which was itself the fulfilment and completion of the ambiguous and tragic story of Israel as a
whole. At the same time, the cross was the supreme achievement of Israel’s God, returning to
Zion as he had promised, to deal with his people’s sins and their consequences. (p77f.)

Dr John is thus mistaken if he supposes that the 1995 Report shares his enthusiasm for doing away
with all talk of God’s condemnation of sin and of that condemnation being a key element in the
meaning of the cross. What about the 1938 Report? Here again things are more nuanced than Dr
John’s rejection of a caricature would indicate. In a special Note ‘On the Wrath of God against Sin’,
the 1938 Report comments:

It is to be observed . . . that in the New Testament the “love” and the “wrath” of God in relation
to sin and forgiveness are closely connected [referring in a footnote to Romans 5:8 in parallel
with Romans 1:18], and that is an important sense in which the assertion of God’s “wrath”
against sin is the indispensable presupposition of any properly Christian doctrine of forgiveness.
There can be no forgiveness where there is indifference towards either the offender or the
offence.

After giving an illustration in which someone’s ‘wrath’ at the betrayal of trust expresses
condemnation of the deed but the desire to be reconciled with the perpetrator – as opposed to a
pure, cold hostility – the Report concludes that

“Wrath” in this ethical sense is not only compatible with love, but in its purest form cannot exist
apart from love. Righteous wrath cannot be based on self-concern, nor at its best is it consistent
with any loss of self-control such as characterises the primitive emotion of anger. (Doctrine in the
Church of England. London: SPCK, 1938, 71.)

Thus we should not be surprised when the Report goes on to stress that God’s love ‘is a holy love,
and therefore always actively affirms itself both in condemning sin and also in striving to restore and
to remake the sinner’ (p91). Like Jenson, the Report insists that the meaning of the Cross must be
taken in its larger narrative context. And, like traditional Anglicanism as expressed in Cranmer’s
liturgy and the Thirty-Nine Articles – but not like Dr John – the Report declares that ‘The Cross is a
satisfaction for sin in so far as the moral order of the universe makes it impossible that human souls
should be redeemed from sin except at a cost. Of this cost the death on the Cross is the
expression...Thus the Cross is a “propitiation” and “expiation” for the sins of the whole world’
(p92f.). Of course, there is much more to what the Report says than that; but not less. If Dr John
wishes to invoke these Reports – not, I insist once more, that they carry, for Anglicans, the same
authority as scripture or even as the church’s historic liturgy and Articles – he should note that they
offer something whose existence he does not wish to acknowledge: a way of affirming that the Cross
does after all have something to do with God’s wrathful condemnation of sin but which is not the
same as the caricature that both Reports, like Dr John and many of the rest of us, reject.

All of which brings us back to Dr John’s talk itself. It wasn’t long, and of course Dr John would no
doubt say, as I have done, that an essay several times the length would still not be enough to do
justice to the topic. But it is therefore all the more frustrating to see how many of his short minutes
he used up in presenting a sad caricature of the biblical doctrines of God’s wrath, God’s moral
providence, and of the atonement itself.

He began by discussing the widespread view that suffering is a punishment from God. He instanced
a bizarre funeral sermon, a Cretan bishop declaring that an earthquake was a punishment for people
using birth control, and the idea that York Minster was struck by lightning in retribution for David
Jenkins’s consecration. (Already his language shows where he is going: ‘some people . . . were
seriously wondering whether God had personally hurled a thunderbolt at York Minster in a fit of
pique . . .’). But this is childish. The biblical doctrine of God’s wrath is rooted in the doctrine of God
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The Cross and the Caricatures 4
as the good, wise and loving creator, who hates – yes, hates, and hates implacably – anything that
spoils, defaces, distorts or damages his beautiful creation, and in particular anything that does that
to his image-bearing creatures. If God does not hate racial prejudice, he is neither good nor loving.
If God is not wrathful at child abuse, he is neither good nor loving. If God is not utterly determined
to root out from his creation, in an act of proper wrath and judgment, the arrogance that allows
people to exploit, bomb, bully and enslave one another, he is neither loving, nor good, nor wise. To
trivialize – almost to domesticate! – this massive biblical doctrine, rooted as it is in the doctrines of
God as creator and as the one who will restore his creation at the last (in other words, in the biblical
sense, ‘judge’), into a few anecdotal trivialities about God petulantly hurling thunderbolts around is
hardly the way to begin a serious argument.

But it gets worse. Dr John declares that the earlier parts of the Old Testament operate with a
simplistic sin-leads-to-judgment philosophy in which sinners are struck down on the spot, good
fortune follows virtue and misery follows vice. Now of course there are parts of Deuteronomy which
do indeed sound like that, just as there are one or two Psalms (one of which Dr John quotes and
tells the Psalmist he ought to get out more) which offer something like that. And no doubt, as
general prudential wisdom goes, it is fairly commonplace not only in Israel but in much of the
ancient, as indeed the modern, world. There is some truth in it: avoid crime and folly and you will
normally have a more peaceful life than a fool or a criminal. The catch, of course, is the word
‘normally’; and in Psalm after Psalm, and in Jewish texts from every period, we discover that the
‘normal’ is regularly thwarted. The Bible is far, far more complex than Dr John allows. Genesis itself,
which he quotes in relation to the judgment of Sodom (though that had been delayed some while, it
seems, and was by no means a foregone conclusion in Genesis 18), is quite clear in chapter 15 that
God’s moral providence is keeping an eye on the wickedness of the Amalekites and will only bring
judgment upon them when they have manifestly and richly deserved it. (Curiously, right at the end
of his piece, Dr John describes the view he rejects as one of God ‘inscrutably allotting rewards and
retributions’, but the view he has been attacking is precisely that God’s actions are not inscrutable,
but can be read off on a quite clear moral index. Does Dr John think God acts in the world? Does he
think that some, or any, of God’s acts can be understood within some kind of moral index? Is it not
Dr John, for most of his piece, who is advocating an ‘inscrutable’ providence?)

Dr John then offers, as his knock-down example that this idea of God condemning people for
particular sins is ‘nonsense’, the passage at the start of Luke 13 where Jesus is informed about
some Galileans whom Pilate had killed in the Temple. Dr John describes the passage very strangely,
suggesting that the Galileans were sectarians who had been holding an illegal sacrifice, and that
Pilate had burned them along with their sacrifices, neither of which is in Luke’s text. He then implies
that it is the disciples who continue by telling Jesus about the eighteen people who were killed when
the tower of Siloam fell on them, whereas in Luke it appears to be Jesus himself who raises this
point. He suggests, in both, that the disciples may be gloating over these wicked sinners getting
their come-uppance, which again is imported into the text; Luke doesn’t say the people who initiate
the conversation are disciples, and though gloating is a possible interpretation it is not necessary.
But the real problem here is that, trying to make the point that suffering is not (for Jesus) the result
of divine condemnation, he cuts off the text a verse too soon. ‘Do you think,’ asks Jesus, ‘that these
people were worse sinners than anyone else?’ Dr John leaves it there; but Jesus goes on (Luke
13:5), ‘No, I tell you, but unless you repent you will all likewise perish.’ And Luke’s gospel continues
with warnings of this sort, warnings about what will happen to Jerusalem and its inhabitants unless
they repent, and warnings which then reach their climax when, as we watch the last events unfold,
Jesus himself takes upon himself the warnings which he had announced for the city and the nation,
dying on a charge of which, as Luke makes clear, he was innocent but a good many around
Jerusalem were manifestly guilty. The substitution of Jesus for Barabbas is merely one sharp focal
point of a larger theme which, though Luke highlights, he certainly did not invent.

Dr John has, in other words, quoted in his favour a passage which, as part of a larger whole, tells
strongly in the opposite direction. He is still eager to point out that the simplistic ‘sinners-get-
punished-while-the-righteous-get-rewarded’ theology doesn’t work, and doesn’t work in the gospels
or in the case of Jesus, without noticing precisely that it is this – the righteous suffering the fate of
the sinners – that actually lays the foundation for the very doctrine he is eager to expunge.

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The Cross and the Caricatures 5
And expunge it he does, when he comes to Paul. Quoting 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Galatians 3:13
(‘God made him to be sin for us who knew no sin,’ and ‘Christ became a curse for us’), he tells us
the explanation of these verses he was given as a child and declares that, because that explanation
is repulsive and nonsensical, we must reject it. His summary starts quite mildly: God was very angry
with us, and had to punish us, but instead he sent his Son as a substitute to die for us, so that God
stopped being angry with us...But then, inserting into this account the things Dr John realised he
disliked at the age of ten, and which he wants to attack to bring down the whole edifice, he goes on:
‘What sort of God was this, getting so angry with the world and the people he created, and then, to
calm himself down, demanding the blood of this own Son? And anyway, why should God forgive us
through punishing somebody else? It was worse than illogical, it was insane. It made God sound like
a psychopath. If any human being behaved like this we’d say they were a monster...It just doesn’t
make sense to talk about a nice Jesus down here, placating the wrath of a nasty, angry Father God
in heaven...sending a substitute to vent his punishment on.’

Well, yes. We must of course grant that many Christians have spoken, in effect, of the angry God
upstairs and the suffering Jesus placating him. Spoken? They’ve painted it: many a mediaeval
altarpiece, many a devotional artwork, have sketched exactly that. And of course for some late
mediaeval theologians this was the point of the Mass: God was angry, but by performing this
propitiatory sacrifice once more, the priest could make it all right. And it was at least in part in
reaction against this understanding of the Eucharist that the Reformers rightly insisted that what
happened on the cross happened once for all. They did not invent, they merely adapted and
relocated, the idea of the propitiation of God’s wrath through the death of Jesus. We must of course
acknowledge that many, alas, have since then offered more caricatures of the biblical doctrine. It is
all too possible to take elements from the biblical witness and present them within a controlling
narrative gleaned from somewhere else, like a child doing a follow-the-dots puzzle without paying
attention to the numbers and producing a dog instead of a rabbit.

This is what happens when people present over-simple stories with an angry God and a loving Jesus,
with a God who demands blood and doesn’t much mind whose it is as long as it’s innocent. You’d
have thought people would notice that this flies in the face of John’s and Paul’s deep-rooted theology
of the love of the triune God: not ‘God was so angry with the world that he gave us his son’ but ‘God
so loved the world that he gave us his son’. That’s why, when I sing that interesting recent song ‘In
Christ alone my hope is found’, and we come to the line, ‘And on the cross, as Jesus died, the wrath
of God was satisfied’, I believe it’s more deeply true to sing ‘the love of God was satisfied’. I
commend that alteration to those who sing that song, which is in other respects one of the very few
really solid recent additions to our repertoire. So we must readily acknowledge that of course there
are caricatures of the biblical doctrine all around, within easy reach – just as there are of other
doctrines, of course, such as that of God’s grace.

But how does the caricature relate to what we find in the New Testament? Actually, how does it
relate to Dr John’s initial summary? There he states, as we saw, that God sent Jesus to do this: yes,
and that’s what the New Testament says too, at all the key points; and if we ask why, the answer is
always, in Paul, John and everywhere else, the wonderful greatness of God’s merciful love. You can’t
play off the juridical account of atonement, so called, against an account which stresses God’s love.
As those Doctrine Reports rightly saw, they belong together. If God is love, he must utterly reject,
and ultimately deal with, all that pollutes, distorts and destroys his world and his image-bearing
creatures.

So what should we make of Paul at this point? Dr John never says. Is he content simply to say that
the key Pauline statements must be left out of consideration as we construct an atonement theology
we can believe today? If so, how can he later quote 2 Corinthians 5:19 (‘God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself’), which, a mere two verses before the one he seems to reject,
might be thought to be part of the same argument? What does he make of the explicit statement –
this, I think, is as clear as it gets in Paul – in Romans 8:3, where Paul says explicitly that God
condemned sin in the flesh of Jesus Christ? Paul does not say that God condemned Jesus; rather,
that he condemned sin; but the place where sin was condemned was precisely in the flesh of Jesus,
and of Jesus precisely as the Son sent from the Father. And this, we remind ourselves, is the heart
of the reason why there is now ‘no condemnation’ for those who are in Christ Jesus (Romans 8:1).
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The Cross and the Caricatures 6
Or what account does Dr John give of Romans 3:24-26? Here, whatever we may think about the
notorious hilasterion (‘propitiation’? ‘expiation’? ‘mercy-seat’?), in the preceding section of the letter
(1:18-3:20) God’s wrath is revealed against all ungodliness and wickedness, and by the end of the
passage, in accordance with the ‘justice’ of God, those who were formerly sinners and under God’s
wrath are now justified freely by grace through faith. To put it somewhat crudely, the logic of the
whole passage makes it look as though something has happened in the death of Jesus through
which the wrath of God has been turned away. It is on this passage that Charles E B Cranfield, one
of the greatest English commentators of the last generation, wrote a memorable sentence which
shows already that the caricature Dr John has offered was exactly that:

We take it that what Paul’s statement that God purposed Christ as a propitiatory victim means is
that God, because in His mercy He willed to forgive sinful men and, being truly merciful, willed to
forgive them righteously, that is, without in any way condoning their sin, purposed to direct
against His own very Self in the person of His Son the full weight of that righteous wrath which
they deserved. (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 2 vols
Edinburgh: T & T Clark; vol 1, 1975, p217.)

Now I do not ask that Dr John, or anyone else, necessarily accept this as the correct interpretation
of Romans 3:24-26; nor that, whether or not they accept this exegesis, they believe that this is a
true statement of God’s intention in the death of Jesus. All I ask is that Dr John admit that this very
careful statement, in which the propitiatory effect of Jesus’ death is seen as the result of God’s
overarching and overwhelming mercy and love, and in which the persons of the Trinity are held in
extremely close union, is not subject to the critique he has levelled against what increasingly looks
like a bizarre (if sadly still well known) caricature.

Let me put it like this. If Dr John were to turn on the radio and hear someone arguing the foolish
and unwarranted case, on the basis of two or three anecdotal examples and a revulsion which they
had had since the age of ten, that all gay men are promiscuous paedophiles and that therefore no
such thing as permanent, faithful and stable gay partnerships were possible, he would rightly object
that a gross caricature was being allowed to stand as the premise of the argument, and that the
conclusion therefore did not follow. That is the kind of situation I find myself in when faced with his
caricature of substitutionary atonement.

Not everyone likes Paul, of course – especially some Anglicans. But what about Jesus? Unless we are
to go the route of the ‘Jesus Seminar’, and say that Jesus’ death was simply an accident which he
never intended and for which, therefore, he offered no theological grid of interpretation, we must
give some account of the self-understanding of Jesus in relation to the death which, as at least one
substantial stream of scholarship has agreed, he must have known was just round the corner. There
were ancient Jewish grids of interpretation available to him, and all the signs are that he made his
own creative construal of them, understanding his vocation as the point of convergence of several
rich strands of scriptural narrative, heavily freighted with the sense of Israel’s long destiny coming
to a dark and decisive climax. In particular, the early Christians were clear that Jesus’ death was to
be understood in terms of Isaiah 53, and they were equally clear that this was not a new idea they
were wishing back on Jesus. ‘The Son of Man,’ he said, ‘came not to be served but to serve, and to
give his life as a ransom for many’ (Mark 10:45). These words – which many have of course been
unwilling to credit to Jesus precisely because of the frantic attempt to prevent him alluding to Isaiah
53 – capture the very heart of that great chapter, and as I and others have argued elsewhere it is
extremely likely, historically, that he made that entire section of the book of Isaiah thematic for his
self-understanding.

Ironically, Dr John himself alludes to Isaiah 53 at the end of his talk, suggesting that Jesus ‘bears
our griefs and shares our sorrows’, without realising that if you get one part of Isaiah 53 you
probably get the whole thing, and with it not only a substitutionary death but a penal substitutionary
death, yet without any of the problems that the caricature would carry:

He was wounded for our transgressions
and bruised for our iniquities;
upon him was the punishment that brought us peace
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The Cross and the Caricatures 7
and with his stripes we are healed.
All we like sheep have gone astray;
We have turned every one to his own way;
And YHWH has laid on him the iniquity of us all.
(Isaiah 53:5–6.)

It is with the Servant, and the theology of the whole of Isaiah 40-55, that we find the explanation
for the otherwise bizarre idea of one person standing in for the many (which, as Dr John says, we
might otherwise find incomprehensible and deeply offensive). The sense which penal substitution
makes it does not make, in the last analysis, within the narrative of feudal systems of honour and
shame. It certainly does not make the sense it makes within the world of some arbitrary lawcourt. It
makes the sense it makes within the biblical world, the Old Testament world, within which the
creator God, faced with a world in rebellion, chose Israel – Abraham and his family – as the means
of putting everything right, and, when Israel itself had rebelled, promised to set that right as well
and so to complete the purpose of putting humans right and thus setting the whole created order
back the right way up. And the long-promised way by which this purpose would be achieved was, as
hints and guesses in the Psalms and prophets indicate, that Israel’s representative, the anointed
king, would be the one through whom this would be accomplished. Like David facing Goliath, he
would stand alone to do for his people what they could not do for themselves. It is because Jesus, as
Israel’s representative Messiah, was therefore the representative of the whole human race, that he
could appropriately become its substitute. That is how Paul’s logic works. ‘One died for all, therefore
all died,’ he wrote in 2 Corinthians 5:14; and thus, seven verses later, ‘God made him to be sin for
us, who knew no sin,’ he concluded seven verses later, ‘so that in him we might become the
righteousness of God’ (5:21). And it is within that argument that we find the still deeper truth, which
is again rooted in the dark hints and guesses of the Old Testament: that the Messiah through whom
all this would be accomplished would be the very embodiment of YHWH himself. ‘God was in Christ,
reconciling the world to himself’ (2 Corinthians 5:19).

Underneath all this discussion is a deep concern which has emerged again in our own day, notably in
the writings of the Yale theologian Miroslav Volf. In his magisterial Exclusion and Embrace
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), he demonstrates, with sharp examples from his native Balkans, that it
simply won’t do, when faced with radical evil, to say, ‘Oh well, don’t worry, I will love you and
forgive you anyway.’ That (as the 1938 Doctrine Report already saw) is not forgiveness; it is
belittling the evil that has been done. Genuine forgiveness must first ‘exclude’, argues Volf, before it
can ‘embrace’; it must name and shame the evil, and find an appropriate way of dealing with it,
before reconciliation can happen. Otherwise we are just papering over the cracks. As I said early on,
if God does not hate the wickedness that happens in his beautiful world, he is neither a good nor a
just God, and chaos is come again. Somehow I sense that Dr John knows this, since he writes
movingly of Jesus Christ as God coming down into the midst of the mess and the muddle to be with
us and . . . to rescue us – though he never says how this rescue is effected. But again and again I
sense in Dr John’s writing the problem which Anselm already identified: you have not yet considered
how serious sin is. It isn’t that God happens to have a petulant thing about petty rules. He is the
wise and loving creator who cannot abide his creation being despoiled. On the cross he drew the full
force not only of that despoiling, but of his own proper, judicial, punitive rejection of it, on to
himself. That is what the New Testament says. That is what Jesus himself, I have argued elsewhere,
believed what was going on. That is what the classic Anglican formularies and liturgy say.

Recently, looking for something else, I came upon this:

God is love, say [some], and therefore he does not require a propitiation. God is love, say the
Apostles, and therefore he provides a propitiation. Which of these doctrines appeals best to the
conscience? Which of them gives reality, and contents, and substance, to the love of God? Is it
not the apostolic doctrine? Does not the other cut out and cast away that very thing which made
the soul of God’s love to Paul and John? ...Nobody has any right to borrow the words ‘God is love’
from an apostle, and then to put them in circulation after carefully emptying them of their
apostolic import. ...But this is what they do who appeal to love against propitiation. To take the
condemnation out of the Cross is to take the nerve out of the Gospel...Its whole virtue, its
consistency with God’s character, its aptness to man’s need, its real dimensions as a revelation of
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The Cross and the Caricatures 8
love, depend ultimately on this, that mercy comes to us in it through judgment. (James Denney,
The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Expositor’s Bible, Hodder, 1894, p221f.)

When I read that, it sounded as though Denney were addressing Dr John directly. And I was put in
mind of a characteristically gentle remark of Henry Chadwick, in his introductory lectures on doctrine
which I attended my first year in Oxford. After carefully discussing all the various theories of
atonement, Dr Chadwick allowed that there were of course some problems with the idea of penal
substitution. But he said, ‘until something like this has been said, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the full story has not yet been told.’ For myself, I prefer to go with Henry Chadwick, and James
Denney – and Wesley and Watts, and Cranmer and Hooker, and Athanasius and Augustine and
Aquinas – and Paul, Peter, Mark, Luke, John – and, I believe Jesus himself. To throw away the
reality because you don’t like the caricature is like cutting out the patient’s heart to stop a
nosebleed. Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures, and all because of the unstoppable
love of the one creator God. There is ‘no condemnation’ for those who are in Christ, because on the
cross God condemned sin in the flesh of the Son who, as the expression of his own self-giving love,
had been sent for that very purpose. ‘He did not spare his very own Son, but gave him up for us all.’
That’s what Good Friday was, and is, all about.


3. Pierced for Our Transgressions

That is why I was all the more frustrated when I came upon a new book by the recently appointed
Principal-elect of Oak Hill College, Mike Ovey, and two students of that college, Steve Jeffrey and
Andrew Sach. The book is entitled Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal
Substitution (IVP, 2007). It is substantial, with over three hundred pages of text and detailed
annotations, and carries enthusiastic commendations – no fewer than ten pages of them! – from the
great and good of the particular tradition within which the authors stand. Let me say, by way of
introduction to my comments on this book, that I can fully understand the frustration, within that
tradition, at the way in which some recent writers from within the evangelical world have cast doubt,
or worse, on penal substitution as a whole. There do seem to me to be some evangelicals who have
done what Jeffrey John has done – rejected the doctrine because of the caricatures.

At this point, however, I must turn aside for a moment, not to vindicate myself particularly but to
muse on a phenomenon. One of the most lively and effective Christian leaders in the UK in recent
years is Steve Chalke of Oasis Trust and Faithworks. When I was myself working in London Steve
came to see me a couple of times, with an assistant. They had been reading my books on Jesus and
wanted to be sure they had understood what I was getting at; clearly they were excited by the way
I was reading the gospels and by the portrait of Jesus and his kingdom-bringing work that I was
advancing. Steve then (together with Alan Mann) produced a short, sharp, clear and challenging
little book called The Lost Message of Jesus (Zondervan 2003). He sent me an advance copy. Since
– almost embarrassingly at times – the book follows quite closely several of the lines of thought I
have myself advanced, though giving them a good deal more energy through shrewd use of
anecdote and illustration, I could do no other than write a strong commendation. What I said was
this:

Steve Chalke’s new book is rooted on good scholarship, but its clear, punchy style makes it
accessible to anyone and everyone. Its message is stark and exciting: Jesus of Nazareth was far
more challenging in his own day, and remains far more relevant to ours, than the church has
dared to believe, let alone preach.

Part of that was quoted prominently on the front cover. I stand by every word I wrote.

Imagine my puzzlement, then, when I heard that a great storm had broken out because ‘Steve
Chalke has denied substitutionary atonement’. After all, the climax of my book Jesus and the Victory
of God, upon which Steve had relied to quite a considerable extent, is the longest ever
demonstration, in modern times at least, that Jesus’ self-understanding as he went to the cross was
rooted in, among other Old Testament passages, Isaiah 53, the clearest and most uncompromising
statement of penal substitution you could find. I shall return to this below, and to the puzzle that
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The Cross and the Caricatures 9
many of the new right-wing (so-called ‘conservative’) evangelicals have turned their back on the
deepest and richest statement of the doctrine they claim to cherish, namely the one lived and
announced by Jesus himself. But back to Steve Chalke. I was puzzled, as I say, when I heard about
the fuss, because I hadn’t remembered Steve denying at that point something I had been affirming,
and since I had been strongly and deeply affirming the substitutionary (and, yes, penal) nature of
Jesus’ death I wasn’t sure whether I had missed something. I was prepared to say, in effect, ‘Well, I
obviously missed that bit when I read the book, and if he said that I disagree with him,’ and to write
it off as a warning to read a book extremely carefully before commending it. And so it might have
rested, at least for me; I have been far too busy in the last three years to take any part in what I
gather have been ongoing and at times acrimonious inter-evangelical discussions.

But, faced with the Oak Hill book, and its angry denunciation of Steve Chalke (pp25f, 327f), I
thought I ought to take another look. (The show now runs and runs: on the day that I am writing
this (April 20), the Church of England Newspaper has a letter from someone saying, casually, that
Steve Chalke, like Jeffrey John, ‘denies penal substitution’ and thus undermines more or less
everything else in the Bible.) I have just re-read Steve’s short chapter on the meaning of the cross
within the mission of Jesus. He says many things I agree with, and, though he doesn’t actually make
the main point that I made in Jesus and the Victory of God chapter 12, drawing on Isaiah 53 in
particular, he does say,

Just as a lightning-conductor soaks up powerful and destructive bolts of electricity, so Jesus, as
he hung on that cross, soaked up all the forces of hate, rejection, pain and alienation all around
him. (The Lost Message of Jesus p179).

Earlier on in the chapter he had expressed puzzlement at how ‘basic statements of the gospel’ in
ordinary churches would focus mainly on sin and judgment rather than with the love of God, and at
the way in which the cross, seen as the answer to the punishment due for our sin, was becoming the
sum and substance of the gospel to the exclusion even of the resurrection (except in the sense of a
‘happy ending’). Steve is not alone in this puzzlement, and with good reason. As we shall see, the
Bible and the gospel are more many-sided than that. It is in that context that Steve makes his now
notorious statement:

The fact is that the cross isn’t a form of cosmic child abuse – a vengeful Father, punishing his Son
for an offence he has not even committed. Understandably, both people inside and outside of the
Church have found this twisted version of events morally dubious and a huge barrier to faith.
Deeper than that, however, is that such a concept stands in total contradiction to the statement
that “God is Love”. If the cross is a personal act of violence perpetrated by God towards
humankind but borne by his Son, then it makes a mockery of Jesus’ own teaching to love your
enemies and to refuse to repay evil with evil. (p182f)

Now, to be frank, I cannot tell, from this paragraph alone, which of two things Steve means. You
could take the paragraph to mean (a) on the cross, as an expression of God’s love, Jesus took into
and upon himself the full force of all the evil around him, in the knowledge that if he bore it we
would not have to; but this, which amounts to a form of penal substitution, is quite different from
other forms of penal substitution, such as the mediaeval model of a vengeful father being placated
by an act of gratuitous violence against his innocent son. In other words, there are many models of
penal substitution, and the vengeful-father-and-innocent-son story is at best a caricature of the true
one. Or you could take the paragraph to mean (b) because the cross is an expression of God’s love,
there can be no idea of penal substitution at all, because if there were it would necessarily mean the
vengeful-father-and-innocent-son story, and that cannot be right.

Clearly, Steve’s critics have taken him to mean (b), as I think it is clear Jeffrey John and several
others intend. I cannot now remember what I thought when I read the book four years ago and
wrote my commendation, but I think, since I had been following the argument through in the light of
the arguments I myself have advanced, frequently and at length, about Jesus’ death and his own
understanding of it, that I must have assumed he meant (a). I have now had a good conversation
with Steve about the whole subject and clarified that my initial understanding was correct: he does
indeed mean (a). The book, after all, wasn’t about atonement as such, so he didn’t spell out his view
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The Cross and the Caricatures 10
of the cross in detail; and it is his experience that the word ‘penal’ has put off so many people, with
its image of a violent, angry and malevolent God, that he has decided not to use it. But the reality
that I and others refer to when we use the phrase ‘penal substitution’ is not in doubt, for Steve any
more than for me. ‘There is therefore now no condemnation’ in Romans 8:1 is explained by the fact,
as in Romans 8:3, that God condemned sin in the flesh of his Son: he bore sin’s condemnation in
his body, so we don’t bear it. That, I take it, is the heart of what the best sort of ‘penal substitution’
theory is trying to say, and Steve is fully happy with it. And this leads to the key point: there are
several forms of the doctrine of penal substitution, and some are more biblical than others. What
has happened since the initial flurry of debate about The Lost Message of Jesus has looked, frankly,
like a witch-hunt, with people playing the guilt-by-association game: hands up anyone who likes
Steve Chalke; right, now we know who the bad guys are.

All of which brings us back to Oak Hill, specifically to Steve Jeffrey, Mike Ovey, and Andrew Sach.
Naturally I have an interest in this, because at one point J, O and S quote with approval from my
Romans commentary, and then express surprise that I so positively endorsed Steve Chalke’s book,
which, they say, ‘strongly criticizes the propitiatory and penal ideas Wright expressed here’ (p85,
n123). But life is more complicated than that. J, O and S seem to assume that all references to
propitiation, penal theories, substitution and so forth are basically saying the same thing, so that to
affirm one is to affirm all, and to question one is to deny all. Part of the whole point of the present
essay is to deny that this is so, and to argue for a form of penal substitution which is not open to the
objections raised against some other forms.

And my sorrow, reading Pierced for Our Transgressions, is not only that the book seems to be
unaware of this possibility, but that, despite the ringing endorsements of famous men, it is deeply,
profoundly, and disturbingly unbiblical. That, perhaps, is not the response that J, O and S expect,
and I shall have to spell out what I mean in more detail. But let me first say that one of the book’s
merits – it has several! – is that it firmly and decisively knocks on the head an old canard which is
repeated yet again in a letter in the Church Times (20 April 2007, p13): that ‘penal substitution’ was
invented by Anselm and developed by Calvin, and that it excludes and even contradicts other ideas,
not least the ‘Christus Victor’ theme. Over against this, J, O and S offer a catena of passages from
Justin Martyr, Eusebius of Caesarea, Hilary of Poitiers, Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose,
Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, Gelasius of Cyzicus, Gregory the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. Of
course, some will object to some of their exegesis; but (to look no further) the fact that both
Athanasius and Augustine have to explain that it is not self-contradictory to think of God, in his love,
propitiating his own wrath by sending his own Son, shows both that they were saying substantially
the same as more recent advocates of substitution have done, and that they were already meeting
the objections that much more modern anti-substitution writers have raised. (It is not clear to me
why J, O and S omit all mention or discussion of Anselm from their list, and indeed from their entire
discussion; nor why they would not draw attention to Martin Luther himself as a major exponent of
the doctrine. Possible examples even earlier than Justin may be found in Ignatius, Trallians 2.1;
Letter of Barnabas 5.1f, quoting Isaiah 53; and Barnabas 7 (on the scapegoat) and 8 (on the
sacrificial heifer). The idea that it was only Anselm and Calvin who invented, developed and
propagated the doctrine is, alas, perhaps unintentionally endorsed by the Appendix to the 1995
Report. And of course the Anglican Reformers, including those who wrote the Articles and Prayer
Book, gave clear expression to the same basic line, despite what people sometimes assert.)

What then do I mean by saying that Pierced for Our Transgressions is deeply unbiblical? Just this: it
abstracts certain elements from what the Bible actually says, elements which are undoubtedly there
and which undoubtedly matter, but then places them within a different framework, which admittedly
has a lot in common with the biblical one, but which, when treated as though it were the biblical
one, becomes systematically misleading. An illustration I have often used may make the point.
When a child is faced with a follow-the-dots puzzle, she may grasp the first general idea – that the
point is to draw a pencil line joining the dots together and so making a picture – without grasping
the second – that the point is to draw the lines according to the sequence of the numbers that go
with each dot. If you ignore the actual order of the numbers, you can still join up all the dots, but
you may well end up drawing, shall we say, a donkey instead of an elephant. Or you may get part of
the elephant, but you may get the trunk muddled up with the front legs. Or whatever. Even so, it is
possible to join up all the dots of biblical doctrines, to go down a list of key dogmas and tick all the
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The Cross and the Caricatures 11
boxes, but still to join them up with a narrative which may well overlap with the one the Bible tells
in some ways but which emphatically does not in other ways. And that is, visibly and demonstrably,
what has happened in Pierced for Our Transgressions, at both large and small scale.

Large scale: when the authors set out their systematic (and would-be biblical!) theology, in chapter
3, they offer a clear, unambiguous example of a problem which has lain deep within some strands of
western theology, both Catholic and Protestant, for many generations. They ignore the story of
Israel. Yes, they draw on the Old Testament here and there: the Passover lamb and other sacrificial
types. They make plenty of use of Old Testament passages and themes. But there is no sense that
the basic biblical answer to the problem we encounter in Genesis 3-11 (the problem, in other words,
of human sin and its consequences) begins with Genesis 12, with the call of Abraham; that the
entire Old Testament narrative demands to be seen within this framework; and that the very
passages they appeal to in the New Testament demand to be read in the same way. Their grand
narrative goes from creation, fall, sin and judgment to the internal relationships within the Trinity
and thence to penal substitution. But the fully biblical meaning of the cross, as presented by the four
evangelists, is that the cross means what it means as the climax of the entire story of Jesus – and
that the story of Jesus means what it means as the climax of the entire narrative to which the
gospels offer themselves as the climactic and decisive moment, namely, the story of Israel from
Abraham to Jesus (just read Matthew 1), and thus the story of Israel seen as the divine answer to
the problem of Adam. This is a point which the authors have scarcely begun to grasp, foundational
though it is to all second-Temple Jewish and New Testament thinking (see, eg, 94 note 153, where
the centrality of Adam in the argument of Romans 3-8, which is precisely the point I am making, is
advanced as a reason why it might be difficult to see the passage as a retelling of the Jewish story;
for a moment, on p95, they suggest that Abraham’s family should have been the means of blessing
for all, but they never see that this is a major key to the entire biblical worldview). I have explored
the biblical narrative from this point of view in several places, not least the central chapter of my
recent book Evil and the Justice of God, and I have watched with frustration as those who profess to
be ‘biblical’ in their orientation shy away from listening to what the text actually says.

This is abundantly clear in the small-scale detail of the exegesis of Romans and Galatians, which is
of course central to any discussion of the meaning of the cross in early Christianity. Somehow, J, O
and S manage to discuss the key passage in Romans 3 (3:24-26) without any acknowledgement
that the passage is framed within a larger argument which is all about ‘the righteousness of God’,
which, admittedly itself a controversial topic, is Paul’s way at least of saying what has to be said in
answer to the problem of idolatry, sin and wrath which has been set out in 1:18-3:20. And this leads
to a complete marginalisation of Abraham in Romans 4, where the question of forgiveness of sins
(4:6-8) is framed within a lengthy and careful exposition of Genesis 15, the chapter where God
made the covenant with Abraham to which, Paul argues, he has now been faithful in the death and
resurrection of Jesus (4:2f). In other words, Paul is determined to see the answer to human sin and
its consequences as the long-term outworking of God’s call of and covenant with Abraham; it is
God’s faithfulness to that promise which has meant that he has, at last, sent Jesus to do that which
Israel as a whole had failed to do. Jesus’ death, described densely if precisely in 3:24-26, means
what it means within that framework.

The same is true, if anything even more obviously, in Galatians 3, where the entire argument from
verse 6 to verse 29 is framed by the question, Who are the true children of Abraham? – though
you’d never have known that from J, O and S. Why does this matter? Well, the point about Israel
being under the curse of the law in 3:10-14 is not to be at once construed as a general statement of
the sinful plight of all humanity, and the cross as the moment when Jesus took the sin, and the
curse, of all. Even if that is a point which Paul might well have agreed with, it is not what he is
saying in these verses. Had he been, he should have said something like ‘Christ became a curse for
us, so that we might be freed from the guilt, penalty and power of sin’, whereas in fact he says,
‘Christ became a curse for us, so that the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles, and
that we (presumably Jewish Christians) might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith’. In
other words, Paul is addressing a very specific problem here, which only comes into view once you
grasp the biblical worldview in which Abraham (or, more fully, the promise which God makes
through him) is the answer to the plight of all humanity. The acting-out, by Abraham’s family, of the
primal sin of Adam (the point Paul makes in Romans 5:20 and then Romans 7:7-25), means that
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The Cross and the Caricatures 12
the blessing looked as if it might, so to speak, get stuck: if Israel has failed in her calling, how will
God be true to what he promised to and through Abraham? This brings us back to Romans 3:1-9,
another passage which makes no impact on J, O and S in their understanding of the later part of
Romans 3: Israel has been unfaithful to her commission, but God remains faithful. The answer is
that God has dealt with this very specific problem in the Messiah’s becoming a curse, bearing in his
own body the curse which hung over Israel, and thus unblocking the road for the promise to flow
through to the Gentiles, as always intended.

Part of the problem, of course, is that Paul never says the same thing twice when discussing the
cross. The cross plays a thousand different (though interlocking) roles within his various arguments.
Taking these references effectively out of their exegetical contexts and making them speak within a
different context, a different line of thought (not a totally different one, of course, but one which has
been fairly drastically reshaped by a fairly decisive omission of one of the most important points,
and then reshaped further around a different kind of narrative which, yes, owes more to Anselm and
others after him than to Paul), is bound to produce distortions.

But the biggest, and most worrying, unbiblical feature of Pierced for Our Transgressions is the
outright refusal to have anything seriously to do with the gospels. This is a massive problem, which I
believe to be cognate with all kinds of other difficulties within today’s church, not least within today’s
evangelicalism. There is no space here to open up this question more than a very little. Let me just
tell it as I see it on reading this new book.

I was startled, to begin with, at the fact that the foundational chapter, entitled ‘Searching the
Scriptures: The Biblical Foundations of Penal Substitution’, has precisely six pages on the Gospel of
Mark, a good bit of which consists of lengthy biblical quotations, and four on John. And that’s it for
the gospels. I don’t disagree with most of those ten pages, but it is truly astonishing that a book like
this, claiming to offer a fairly full-dress and biblically-rooted doctrine of the meaning of the cross,
would not only omit Matthew and Luke, and truncate Mark and John so thoroughly (sifting them for
prooftexts, alas), but would ignore entirely the massive and central question of Jesus’ own attitude
to his own forthcoming death, on the one hand, and the way in which the stories the evangelists tell
are themselves large-scale interpretations of the cross, on the other. One would not know, from this
account, that there was anything to all this other than Mark 10.45 (‘the Son of Man came . . . to
give his life as a ransom for many’) and a few other key texts, such as the ‘cup’ which Jesus prayed
might pass, but which he eventually drank. And here, of course, I declare a substantial interest.

I grew up in a theological world where the question, Did Jesus think he was the Isaianic ‘Servant’?,
was a matter of considerable interest. Those who were prepared to allow some kind of
substitutionary interpretation of Jesus’ death tended to say ‘Yes’; among the best of those accounts,
thirty years ago, was R T France’s book Jesus and the Old Testament (Tyndale, 1971). Those who
were eager to rule out such an interpretation were strongly opposed to thinking that Jesus could
have thought any such thing; among the best-known of those accounts, back then, was Morna
Hooker’s book Jesus and the Servant (SPCK, 1959). The debate has rumbled on, with Germans like
Joachim Jeremias and Otto Betz on France’s side and others like Otfried Hofius on Hooker’s. In
recent Jesus-scholarship, the ‘Jesus Seminar’ school of thought has naturally denied that Jesus had
any thought of dying, let alone any advance theological interpretation of such an event, while the
so-called ‘Third Quest’ has mostly maintained a discreet disjunction between understanding what
Jesus thought his own kingdom-proclamation was all about and what he may have thought about his
increasingly likely early and violent death. Now, people will have different views about all this, but it
can hardly be a matter of indifference to a book purporting to tell us in a full and quite final way
what the meaning of the cross really was, and to defend the ‘substitutionary’ interpretation against
others. And the frustrating thing is that I and others have made a case for understanding Jesus’ own
vocation in terms of Isaiah 53 in a way which simultaneously grounds something that can
reasonably be called ‘penal substitution’ in the vocation of Jesus himself and makes it clear that this
view does not partake of the caricature that the doctrine is sometimes subjected to, and hence is
not subject to the critiques of that caricature that are advanced from time to time. This is why it is
so frustrating, to the point of becoming almost funny, to find people like J, O and S debating
earnestly whether N T Wright really believes in penal substitution (p94f). Go and read the book, I
wanted to say to them. I have provided the fullest and most detailed argument I know for saying
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The Cross and the Caricatures 13
that Jesus really did make Isaiah 53 centrally thematic to his self-understanding; I have located it
historically; I have tried to demonstrate that the early church’s understanding of Jesus’ death
developed from that point but were not essentially fresh or foreign. I am forced to conclude that
there is a substantial swathe of contemporary evangelicalism which actually doesn’t know what the
gospels themselves are there for, and would rather elevate ‘Paul’ (inverted commas, because it is
their reading of Paul, rather than the real thing, that they elevate) and treat Matthew, Mark, Luke
and John as mere repositories of Jesus’ stories from which certain doctrinal and theological nuggets
may be collected. And this, sadly, chimes in with other impressions I have received from elsewhere
within the same theological stable – with, for instance, the suggestion that since Paul’s epistles give
us ‘the gospel’ while ‘the Gospels’ simply give us stories about Jesus, we shouldn’t make the reading
of the latter into the key moment in the first half of the Communion Service. (In case anyone should
rub their eyes in disbelief, I have actually heard this seriously argued more than once in the last
year or two.)

I think this problem, actually, goes back to the Reformation itself, though that is another, and much
longer, story. But let me put it like this, as a proposition whose proof is, once more, Jesus and the
Victory of God chapter 12, Evil and the Justice of God chapter 3, and the sundry other things listed
in the Bibliography at the end of this piece. The gospels, as whole narratives, are deliberately telling
the story of Jesus and his kingdom-inauguration in such a way as to say, on the one hand, that this
is how the long story of Israel (which is, remember, the story of how the creator God is redeeming
the whole world) is reaching its God-ordained climax, and in such a way as to say, on the other
hand, that it is this story to which the crucifixion of Jesus is itself the climax. The understanding of
the cross offered by the four canonical gospels, in other words, is not to be reduced to a handful of
prooftexts taken here and there. These are merely the tips of the iceberg. The evangelists’
understanding of the cross is that it means what it means as the climax of this story – the story of
Israel compressed into the story of its representative, the Messiah, whose task was precisely to
draw the threads of that narrative together. Read in this way, the multiple strands of idolatry, sin,
evil, wickedness, oppression, violence, judgment and all the rest throughout the Old Testament
come rushing together and do their worst to Jesus. He takes their full force, and does so because
that was God’s purpose all along. That is why, though I have argued here and in many other places
for something that can be called ‘penal substitution’, I regard the ‘Christus Victor’ theme as the
overarching one within which substitution makes its proper point, though that would take a lot
longer to demonstrate. And it ought to be quite clear, if we read the gospels in this way, that what
many have seen (and dismissed!) as the mere ‘political’ or ‘historical’ reasons for Jesus’ death –
Pilate’s duplicitous vacillation, the Chief Priest’s cynical scheming, and so on – are themselves part
of the ‘theological’ interpretation of the cross offered by the evangelists.

I hope it is now clear what I meant by saying that my main problem with Pierced for Our
Transgressions is that it is hopelessly sub-biblical. My heart sinks when I read what the great
contemporary heroes of conservative Christianity have said inside the front cover. Peter Adam from
Melbourne says that the book shows how the cross integrates into the big themes of the Bible,
whereas, if I am right, it is precisely the big themes of the Bible that have been ignored. Don Carson
says that the book successfully refutes some people who ‘are not listening very carefully to what
either Scripture or history says’, whereas it seems to me that it is the authors of this book who are
not paying proper attention to Scripture itself. I was going to quote more – ‘its great strength lies in
its comprehensive exegesis of the biblical text itself’, says one dear and good man; ‘they have a firm
grasp of the biblical material’, says another; and so on, and so on. It becomes embarrassing. I have
this unhappy sense that a large swathe of contemporary evangelicalism has (accidentally and
unintentionally, of course) stopped its ears to the Bible, and hence to the God of the Bible, and is
determinedly pursuing a course dictated by evangelical tradition rather than by scripture itself. And
then they are surprised that those who do not fall within that tradition cannot hear what they are
saying – and sometimes denounce them as unbelievers. (Which is not to say that there are not
unbelieving stances taken on this issue; merely that the charge should be withheld until we have
actually listened to what people are saying, and can be sure that it really is unfaith, rather than a
firm grasp on part of the scriptures that evangelical tradition has screened out, that is driving the
objection.)

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The Cross and the Caricatures 14
Not, of course, that I claim myself to be infallible in my own interpretation of scripture. But it will not
do (to anticipate an obvious reaction) to suggest that some recent works from the same school have
effectively holed my exegesis, eg of Paul, below the water-line. Just because I have not had the time
to respond, for instance, to Mark Seifrid, Don Carson and others in some of their recent polemic,
does not mean that I am conceding the points they have made – not least because I see no
evidence that they are really trying to hear what I and others are saying, but are instead simply
waving us away as hopeless ‘new perspective’ people. There are large issues here of theological
method and biblical content, all interacting with other large issues of contemporary hermeneutics:
would I be totally wrong, for instance, to see some of the horrified reaction to Steve Chalke, and to
some of the ‘Emerging Church’ reappropriation of the gospels, as a reaction, not so much against
what is said about the atonement, but against the idea, which is powerfully present in the gospels,
that God’s kingdom is coming, with Jesus, ‘on earth as in heaven’, and that if this is so we must
rethink several cherished assumptions within the western tradition as a whole? Might it not be the
case that the marginalisation of the four gospels as serious theological documents within Western
Christianity, not least modern evangelicalism, is a fear that if we took them seriously we might have
to admit that Jesus of Nazareth has a claim on our political life as well as our spiritual life and
‘eternal destiny’? And might there not be a fear, among those who are most shrill in their
propagation of certain types of ‘penal substitution’, that there might be other types of the same
doctrine which would integrate rather closely with the sense that on the cross God passed sentence
on all the human powers and authorities that put Jesus there? John 18 and 19 as a whole (and not
only in individual words and phrases), and 1 Corinthians 2 and Colossians 2 as wholes, have an
enormous amount to say about the biblical meaning of the cross which you would never, ever guess
from reading Pierced for Our Transgressions and other works like it.

Two final notes. First, the notion of ‘sacrifice’ is a highly contested and problematic concept within all
contemporary discussion. I have no problem whatever with saying (a) that the Passover lamb clearly
had something to do with warding off God’s judgment; (b) the New Testament writers identify Jesus
as the true Passover lamb; therefore (c) the NT is aligning Jesus with this type of sacrifice and this
type of atoning significance. Nor do I have any quarrel with seeing the NT adopting ‘Day of
Atonement’ ideas in its interpretation of Jesus’ death, and seeing that there, too, there is a clear
sense of the sacrificial animals bearing the sins of the people in a substitutionary way. But problems
remain. For a start, you cannot easily align sacrifice and lawcourt. When an animal is killed
sacrificially, it is by no means clear that it is simply taking the punishment which would otherwise
fall on the worshipper. That would be a crude diminishment of even the Passover, where the idea of
averting wrath is paramount; it does not work at all for several of the sacrifices, and attempts to
make it work (for instance, in J, O and S’s attempted refutation of John Goldingay on pp47f) are
lame and unconvincing. We shouldn’t forget that of the two goats on the Day of Atonement, the one
over whose head confession of sin was made was the one that was not sacrificed, presumably
because it was thereby unclean. As a historian and theologian, I have a sense that we all need to do
a good deal more work on ‘sacrifice’, to understand more of its depths and meaning before we
flatten it out into ‘animals taking our punishment’ and then transfer that wholesale to Jesus. I am
not saying that there is nothing penal or substitutionary in the OT sacrificial system, merely that the
whole is much greater and more complex than this particular part.

Second, in Paul in particular ‘sin’ is not just human wrongdoing. It is a force, a power, almost
equivalent (in Romans 7, for instance) to ‘satan’ itself. One of Paul’s clearest statements of God
executing sentence of condemnation at the cross, as I said before, is found in Romans 8:3, where it
is ‘sin’ itself, as an almost personified force, that is condemned. This element, which sits so close to
the ‘Christus Victor’ theme found in 1 Corinthians 2 and Colossians 2, is not taken into account in
the Procrustean bed offered by Pierced for Our Transgressions. Had it been, a more nuanced – and,
once again, a far more biblical! – account might have opened up.

I am not saying, then, that Jeffrey, Ovey and Sach have got it all wrong. Far from it. They point in
all kinds of good and helpful directions. But there is no evidence that they have actually listened to
what other people are saying – including people like myself who strongly affirm the biblical doctrine
of penal substitution but equally firmly insist on its being understood within its truly biblical context
and not some other. There is much more to be said about their book, no doubt, and what I have
said here has inevitably been unbalanced in terms of a proper review. But I have thought it
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The Cross and the Caricatures 15
important to make it clear that, in rejecting the sweeping dismissal by Jeffrey John of any kind of
substitutionary atonement, I am making a plea for some vital and deeply biblical distinctions
between different types of that doctrine.


Conclusion

Sadly, the debate I have reviewed – with the honourable and brief exception of Robert Jenson’s
article which began this whole train of thought – shows every sign of the postmodern malaise of a
failure to think, to read texts, to do business with what people actually write and say rather than (as
is so much easier!) with the political labelling and dismissal of people on the basis of either flimsy
evidence or ‘guilt by association’. We live in difficult times and it would be good to find evidence of
people on all sides of all questions taking the attitude of the Beroeans in Acts 17, who ‘searched the
scriptures daily to see if these things were so’, instead of ‘knowing’ in advance what scripture is
going to say, ought to say, could not possibly say, or must really have said (if only the authors
hadn’t made it so obscure!).

I am aware, as I said at the outset, that this is only a tip-of-the-iceberg treatment, written in haste
in the midst of many other pressing engagements. Yet I hope it will serve as at least an amber light
in the path of various people in various positions who speed down the road of their particular
affirmations or denials without thinking that there might be interesting intersections coming up at
which they ought, at least, to slow down and watch for traffic on connecting roads. Because a lot of
these roads do connect up, actually, and those of us whose calling is to hold together the church as
best we can – while not capitulating to the laissez-faire ‘anything goes’ of the times – need to put up
some signposts to those connections, and even give out a few maps as to where some of those
roads might lead to, or have come from. It would indeed be good, sooner or later, if someone would
work out a full map of all the different things people have meant by ‘penal substitution’, so that
distinctions could be more finely drawn between the very different versions of that doctrine on offer.
I have pointed towards that task but have not taken it very far.

And it would be good, above all, if all participants in debates about the atonement might be able to
agree on something which again I haven’t explored here very far but which seems to me crucially
important. As I said at the start, when Jesus was going to his own death, he indicated pretty clearly
that he saw all the lines of scriptural narrative converging at this point; and, to help his disciples get
the full meaning and benefit of what was about to happen, he didn’t give them a theory, he gave
them a meal. That meal – which was much more than a Passover meal, but not less – contains in
itself not only all the various meanings of ‘atonement’ that are worth considering, but also the
means by which theories can be turned into real life. Personal, practical, political life. Kingdom-of-
God-on-earth-as-in-heaven life. And that, after all, is what ‘atonement’ ought to be about.



Dr N T Wright is Bishop of Durham














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The Cross and the Caricatures 16
Bibliography of works by N. T. Wright which relate to the above (and see too other material on
www.ntwrightpage.com ):

Books
2006 Evil and the Justice of God. London: SPCK; Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, especially chapter 3
2005 The Scriptures, the Cross, and the Power of God. London: SPCK; Louisville: Westminster John Knox
2005 Paul: Fresh Perspectives. London: SPCK; Minneapolis: Fortress (US title: Paul in Fresh Perspective)
2004 Paul for Everyone: Romans. 2 vols. London: SPCK; Louisville: Westminster John Knox
2003 Hebrews for Everyone. London: London: SPCK; Louisville: Westminster John Knox
2002 The Meal Jesus Gave Us (reissue of Holy Communion for Amateurs). London: Hodder; Louisville:
Westminster John Knox (2003)
2002 Romans in the New Interpreter’s Bible. Vol X., 393–770. Nashville: Abingdon
2002 Paul for Everyone: Galatians and Thessalonians. London: SPCK; Louisville: Westminster John Knox
1999 The Challenge of Jesus. Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press; London: SPCK, especially chapter 4.
1999 The Way of the Lord: Christian Pilgrimage in the Holy Land and Beyond. London: SPCK; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, especially chapter 8
1999 The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions. With Marcus J. Borg. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco; London:
SPCK, especially chapter 6
1997 For All God’s Worth. London: SPCK; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, especially chapter 5
1996 Jesus and the Victory of God. Volume II of Christian Origins and the Question of God. London: SPCK;
Minneapolis: Fortress, especially chapter 12
1994 Following Jesus: Biblical Reflections on Christian Discipleship London: SPCK; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans
(1995), especially Part I
1992 The Crown and the Fire. London: SPCK (1992); Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, (1995), especially Part I
1992 New Tasks for a Renewed Church. London: Hodder. Published by Bethany House, U.S.A., under the title
Bringing the Church to the World, especially chapter 6
1991 The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology. Edinburgh: T & T Clark (October
1991); Minneapolis: Fortress (February 1992), especially chapters 2, 7, 10, 11

Major Articles
2006 ‘New Perspectives on Paul’, in Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary
Challenges, ed. Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic), 243–264
2004 ‘Redemption from the New Perspective’, in Redemption, ed. S. T. Davis, D. Kendall, G. O’Collins (Oxford:
OUP), 69–100
2000 ‘Gospels’, in Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. A. Hastings. Oxford: OUP, 274–6.
2000 ‘The Letter to the Galatians: Exegesis and Theology’ in Joel B. Green and Max Turner, eds., Between Two
Horizons: Spanning New Testament Studies and Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans),
205–36
1999 ‘New Exodus, New Inheritance: the Narrative Substructure of Romans 3—8’ in Romans and the People of
God: Essays in Honor of Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, ed. S. K. Soderlund and
N. T. Wright (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 26–35.
1998 ‘The Servant and Jesus: The Relevance of the Colloquy for the Current Quest for Jesus’, in Jesus and the
Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins, ed. William H. Bellinger, Jr. and William R. Farmer.
Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International. 281–297.
1996 ‘Jesus’, in Early Christian Thought in its Jewish Context, ed. John Barclay & John Sweet. Cambridge:
C.U.P., 43–58.
1995 ‘Romans and the Theology of Paul’, in Pauline Theology, Volume III, ed. David M. Hay & E. Elizabeth
Johnson, 30–67. Minneapolis: Fortress. (Republished, with minor alterations, from SBL 1992 Seminar
Papers, ed. E. H. Lovering, pp. 184–213.)
1994 ‘Gospel and Theology in Galatians’, in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for
Richard N. Longenecker, eds. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson, pp. 222–239. Journal for the Study
of the New Testament, Supplement Series 108. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
1993 ‘On Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5:21’, in Pauline Theology, Volume II, ed. D. M.
Hay: Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, 200–208.

Gunton, Trinity, Church

Trinity and Ontology: Colin Gunton’s
Ecclesiology1
ROLAND CHIA*
Abstract: Colin Gunton argues that there is a need to develop an ontology of
the church on the basis of the concept of God as triune. There is an analogy
between the being of God and the being of the church. Against the
monistic and hierarchical conceptions of the church, so common in the West,
Gunton develops a communio-ecclesiology based on his understanding of
relationality as a transcendental. In addition, Gunton argues that we must move
towards an ecclesiology of perichoresis in which the church as a community is
the result of the mutual constitutiveness of persons.
In an important essay entitled ‘The Church on Earth: The Roots of Community’
Colin Gunton argues that modern ecclesiology is dominated by monistic and
hierarchical conceptions of the church.2 Gunton maintains that this tendency is
largely due to theology’s failure to reflect more deeply on the ontology of the church.
More precisely, he asserts that the deficiencies in modern conceptions of the
church are due to theology’s failure to ground its understanding of the church in
the conception of the being of God as triune. The doctrine of the Trinity is often
looked upon as one of the difficulties of Christian belief, ‘a kind of intellectual hurdle
to be leaped before orthodoxy can be acknowledged’.3 Consequently, the doctrine’s
relationship with other theological topics is often elusive and its centrality to all
aspects of belief, worship and life is often missed. As a result, the possibilities
the doctrine holds for nourishing a Christian theology of community are not fully or
even adequately explored by theology. According to Gunton, while early efforts to
develop Christology show evidence of attempts to examine the question of the being
* Trinity Theological College, 490 Upper Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 678093, Republic of
Singapore.
1 A Mandarin translation of this article is published in Zhou Zong Min, ed., Trinity,
Creation and Culture: An Interpretation of Colin Gunton’s Theology (Hong Kong: Logos
Publishers, 2007), pp. 204–28.
2 Colin Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth: The Roots of Community’, in Colin Gunton and
Daniel Hardy, eds., On Being the Church (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989), pp. 48–80.
3 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 49.
International Journal of Systematic Theology Volume 9 Number 4 October 2007
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2400.2007.00274.x
English translation © The author 2007. Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street Malden, MA 02148, USA.
of Christ in relation to God the Father and the Holy Spirit, a similar approach is
almost absent in ecclesiology.
This neglect is seen in both Eastern and Western ecclesiologies. Eastern
ecclesiology, which was developed in a context where Neoplatonism was influential,
betrays a tendency to conceive of reality in terms of degrees and thus to envision a
hierarchically structured world.4 Harnack’s analysis that in Eastern theology the
church is conceived of as the image of a ‘heavenly hierarchy’5 is therefore in some
ways justified. In the West, the conception of the church is derived mainly by analogy
to an earthly empire. Gunton cites Cyprian’s ecclesiology as a classic example in
which the church is conceived as an imitation of a political empire or a military
camp. This hierarchical and authoritarian vision led Cyprian to postulate that the
bishops constitute the ‘real’ church. With Augustine the picture is somewhat more
complex because of the official recognition of the church after Constantine. Although
Augustine understood the church as a community of believers, the changed status of
the church meant that it was a mixed community of believers and unbelievers.
According to Gunton, this led to two significant developments: the first is the stress
on the institutional nature of the church, where the clergy is seen as the real church;
and the second is the platonizing distinction between the visible and invisible church.
The conclusion is inevitable: ‘[t]he real Church – represented by the clergy? – is the
invisible Church, those known only to God, the elect’.6
This survey leads Gunton to conclude that ‘the conception of God as a triune
community made no substantive contribution to the doctrine of the Church’.7
Because the doctrine of the Trinity fails to inform the ontology of the church, rival
ontologies have filled the vacuum. Ecclesiology has as a result been dominated by
monistic and hierarchical conceptions based on an ontology shaped either
by Neoplatonism or some other non-personal metaphysic. Following John Zizioulas,
Gunton maintains that on the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity we can derive a
distinctively Christian ontology. Such an ontology would not only serve as an
alternative to those proposed by the philosophies that shaped the intellectual milieu
of which the church was once a part; it will also be a challenge to modern conditions.
When extended to ecclesiology, this ontology would result in the conception of the
church as community that would provide a needed corrective to the hierarchical and
institutional ecclesiologies. ‘The doctrine of the Trinity, as it comes to us from the
Cappadocian theologians’, Gunton asserts, ‘teaches us that the first thing to be said
about the being of God is that it consists in personal communion’.8 As John Zizioulas
has put it, ‘Communion is for Basil an ontological category. The nature of God is
4 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 50.
5 Adolph von Harnack, History of Dogma, 3rd edn, trans. Neil Buchanan et al. (London,
1897), Vol. IV, p. 279.
6 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 52.
7 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 52.
8 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 66.
Trinity and Ontology: Colin Gunton’s Ecclesiology 453
English translation © The author 2007
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
communion.’9 Put differently, there is an analogous relationship between the being
of the church and the being of God – the church as community may be said to be a
vestige of the Trinity.
An analogy of echo
How then are we to proceed to develop the concept of the being of the church based
on the doctrine of Trinity? Gunton maintains that such an attempt should be made
with great care if we are to avoid two common errors. The first is to appeal directly
to the unity of the three persons in the Godhead as the model for the unity of
the church, and the second is to attempt the converse – to make the hypostatic
distinctions the basis of diversity in the church.10 Both attempts are exercises
in abstraction and therefore betray a lack of theological control. The crucial
intermediate step, according to Gunton, in developing an ontology of the church
based on the doctrine of Trinity is a trinitarian theology of creation. Such an approach
rejects all monistic and pantheistic interpretations of the creation because it insists on
the ontological distinction between the Creator and the creature. More crucially, this
distinction rejects any logical link between the Creator and the creature, thereby
replacing the logical conception of the relationship between God and the world with
a personal one. This means that the relation between God and his creation is the
result of the free personal action of the triune God. It implies that the ontological
distinction between God and the world, ‘far from being the denial of relations, is its
ground’.11 The church, in so far as it is part of the creation, is also finite and
contingent, and is thus related to the triune God also through the free personal action
of the latter. How, then, does the church reflect the being of God? ‘The answer ’, as
John Zizioulas has shown, ‘lies in the word koinonia, perhaps best translated as
community (or perhaps sociality, compare the Russian Sobornost).’12
Before we analyse what it means to describe the church as koinonia, let us
examine more closely how Gunton develops the analogy between God and the
church. For Gunton the being of the church is said to be analogous to the being of
God in so far as the former may be said to be a finite echo or bodying forth of the
divine personal dynamics. Thus the analogy between the being of God and that of
the church must be said to be of an indirect kind: ‘the Church is what it is by virtue
of being called to be a temporal echo of the eternal community that God is’.13 This
brings us to the whole question of the analogy of being which Karl Barth discusses
9 John Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993), p. 134.
10 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 66.
11 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 67.
12 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, pp. 67–8.
13 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 75.
English translation © The author 2007
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
454 Roland Chia
in his magisterial Church Dogmatics.14 There seems to be, for Gunton, an analogia
entis between the church and God by virtue of the fact that the church is creatura
verbi, and therefore part of the creation, as the Reformers put it. The converse
question must now be raised: does this imply that the being of the triune God can be
gleaned from the phenomenon of the empirical church? Put differently, can the
church be said to be a vestigium trinitatis? In so far as the church as a redeemed
community of believers can only be apprehended by faith, as the creeds remind us,
analogia entis must be subordinated to analogia fidei. Thus faith is the epistemic
conditio sine qua non that enables us to apprehend the analogy between the being of
God and that of the church.
The trinitarian conception of God as the highest reality serves as the theological
basis for conceptualizing the relation between the one and the many, a question that
has accompanied philosophical discussion in the West since Parmenides. Reflection
on the nature of the church on the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity would result in
a clearer understanding of the church as community. Crucial to the discussion,
therefore, is the way in which the doctrine of the Trinity itself is understood. The
history of theology has shown that there are important differences in the way in
which the doctrine of the Trinity was developed in the Western and Eastern
traditions. Although the most pronounced divergence between the two traditions is in
their understanding of the relationship between the Son and the Spirit (brought to
expression by the filioque clause of the Western tradition), there are also other
equally important differences. It is not an oversimplification to say with Karl Rahner
that while the Western tradition emphasizes the unity of the Godhead, the Eastern
tradition stresses the hypostatic distinction of the Father, Son and Spirit.15 Such
differences in emphasis are important because they influence the shape of the
respective ecclesiologies, especially when the latter are understood in light of
the Trinity.
Doubtless Augustine played an important role in shaping the Western
conception of the Trinity. However, in an essay entitled ‘Trinitarian Theology
Today’, Gunton addresses three fundamental problems in Augustine’s understanding
of the Trinity that have become endemic in the Western tradition.16 Firstly, by
attempting to conceive patterns of threeness apart from the economy of salvation,
Augustine has separated the being of God – what God is eternally – from his act –
what God does in time. Secondly, the perichoretic principle, opera trinitatis ad extra
sunt indivisa, has sometimes meant for Augustine that no characteristic and
distinguishing forms of actions can be ascribed to the Father, Son and Spirit. This
would in the end make the Trinity irrelevant in our understanding of divine action.
And finally, Augustine’s formulation of the Trinity is problematic because of his
14 For discussion on analogy of being, see Roland Chia, Revelation and Theology: The
Knowledge of God in Balthasar and Barth (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999).
15 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Crossroad, 1998), p. 17.
16 Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1997), p. 4.
Trinity and Ontology: Colin Gunton’s Ecclesiology 455
English translation © The author 2007
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
inadequate concept of person. This is due in the main again to his failure to grasp
adequately the distinctive personae of Father, Son and Spirit in the one God,
compelling him to treat God unipersonally and to locate personhood in the oneness
not the threeness.
Although all these problems have in one way or another indirectly shaped the
Western idea of the ecclesia, it is the third that is perhaps the most serious. Augustine
has famously said that he uses the concept of person to describe the Father, Son and
Spirit in their distinctiveness ‘in order not to remain silent’.17 Furthermore, he admits
that he does not understand the Greek usage of the term hypostasis and concludes,
wrongly, that the Greeks used this term in accordance with common parlance. He
thereby fails to understand that by using hypostasis to describe the distinctions
within the Godhead the Greeks are both commandeering as well as adapting
philosophical language to theology. Augustine’s failure to appreciate the concept
of person has led him to use Aristotelian categories, often abstract and opaque, to
understand the relations within the Godhead. Failure to understand the Greek usage
of hypostasis led Augustine to an individualistic concept of person. This is blatantly
evident in his assertion that ‘the Father is called person in respect to himself, not in
relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit’ (Ad se . . . dicitur persona, non ad filium vel
spiritum sanctum).18 This is further accentuated by the fact that the analogies
forwarded by Augustine are taken from the soul. The quest for the inner Trinity
within the soul, coupled with the idea that the human likeness to God resides in the
mind, have made it difficult to see how the Trinity can shed light on human
relatedness. Such an approach has in large measure spawned Western individualism
in its various forms. Gunton writes:
Since relations are qualifications of the inner Trinity, and not relations between
persons, it becomes difficult to see how the triune relatedness can be brought
to bear on the central question of human relatedness. God’s relatedness is
construed in terms of self-relatedness, with the result that it is as an individual
that the human being is in the image of God, and therefore truly human.19
For Gunton, the Cappadocians were able to create a conception of God in which
God’s being is understood on the basis of personal commitment. In failing fully to
appreciate the achievement of the Cappadocians, and in dwelling on analogies based
on human mentality, Augustine postulates a singular deity for whom community is
merely an epiphenomenon and therefore secondary. For the Cappadocians, the Greek
hypostasis is used in distinction from ousia to refer to the particularity of the Father,
17 Augustine, De Trinitate, V. ix. 10.
18 Augustine, De Trinitate, VII. vi. 11.
19 Colin Gunton, ‘Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology: Towards a Renewal of the Doctrine
of the Imago Dei’, in Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton, eds., Persons, Divine and
Human: King’s College Essays in Theological Anthropology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1991), p. 49.
English translation © The author 2007
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
456 Roland Chia
Son and Holy Spirit in the Godhead. In Letter 236 Basil of Caesarea clarifies the
distinction between ousia and hypostasis thus:
The distinction between ousia and hypostasis is the same as that between the
general and particular; as, for example, between the animal and the particular
man. Wherefore in the case of the Godhead we confess one essence (or
substance), so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a
particular hypostasis in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit
may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct perception of the
separate characteristics of fatherhood, sonship and sanctification, but form one
conception from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly have a sound
account of our faith.
To understand the three as individuals, as is the case in some strands of the Western
tradition, is to miss the point intended by the Cappadocian usage of hypostasis. By
this term the Greek Fathers wish to stress that the ‘three are not individuals but
persons, beings whose reality can only be understood in terms of their relations to
each other, relations by virtue of which they together constitute the being (ousia) of
the one God’.20 By according priority to the concept of person and relation the
Cappadocians transform the meaning of the two terms and consequently the concept
of God, which is now no longer understood in terms of Greek metaphysics but in
terms of communion. As Gregory of Nazianzus has maintained, the nature of the
Trinity must not be understood primarily by attributes like omnipotence, goodness or
eternity but by the relationship between the three members both to each other
(immanent Trinity) and to the world (economic Trinity).21
In Being As Communion John Zizioulas explores the proposals forwarded
by the Cappadocians by arguing that the being of God is constituted by the
interrelationship of the three persons in the Godhead. The thesis in the book is
summarily discussed in an earlier paper titled ‘The Ontology of Personhood’, where
Zizioulas writes:
In God the particular is ontologically ultimate because relationship is permanent
and unbreakable. Because the Father, the Son and the Spirit are always together,
the particular beings are the bearers of the totality of nature, and thus no
contradiction between ‘one’ and ‘many’ can arise. In trying to identify a particular
thing, we have to make it part of a relationship, and not isolate it as an individual.22
20 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p. 39.
21 Thus in his third Theological Oration (Section 16) Gregory could write: ‘I should have
been frightened with your distinction, if it had been necessary to accept one or other of
the alternatives, and not rather put both aside, and state a third and truer one, namely that
“the Father” is not the name either of an essence or of an action, but is the name of the
relation, in which the Father stands to the Son and the Son to the Father.’
22 John Zizioulas, ‘The Ontology of Personhood’, paper prepared, 1985, for the British
Council of Churches’ Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today, p. 9.
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The trinitarian postulate una substantia, tres personae is often taken to mean that in
an ontological sense, God is first the one God, and only then exists as three persons.
Such an approach would result in a substantialist ontology, which collapses into a
monism. The formulation of the Cappadocians, as Zizioulas has rightly pointed out,
surmounts this ontology by insisting that God’s being cannot be understood apart
from God’s triune personhood but coincides with it. The philosophical and
theological implications of this move are clear:
(a) The person is no longer an adjunct to a being, a category we add to a concrete
entity once we have first verified its ontological hypostasis. It is itself the
hypostasis of the being. (b) Entities no longer trace their being to being itself –
that is, being is not an absolute category in itself – but to the person, to precisely
that which constitutes being, that is, enables entities to be entities.23
Zizioulas elaborates on this through his exposition of the intratrinitarian relationship
between the Father, Son and Spirit, concluding that God’s existence itself is a free
personal act. In other words, God does not exist because he cannot but exist. The
Father is not only source but ‘cause’ of the Son and the Spirit. Furthermore,
the Father, according to Zizioulas, is the ‘cause’ of the trinitarian unity, and this
means that it is impossible to think of the one God without also conceiving of the
communion that God is.24 Zizioulas concludes, together with the Cappadocians, that
‘[t]he Holy Trinity is a primordial ontological concept and not a notion which is
added to the divine substance or rather that follows it’.25 Without entirely agreeing
with Zizioulas’ (and the Cappadocians’) monarchical view of the Father,26 Gunton
could nonetheless endorse the view that the Trinity must be understood on the basis
of a relational ontology rather than a substantialist one.
The doctrine of the Trinity discussed above implies that God is neither a
collectivity nor an individual but a communion – a unity of persons in relation. This
helps us to reflect on how the church is also a community, analogous to the
being of God. On the one hand, ‘the doctrine of the Trinity as a dynamic personal
ordering of giving and receiving is, in the idea of sociality that it suggests, the key to
the matter of transcendentality that we are seeking’.27 The idea of communion
in the trinitarian relations in the Godhead also presents the conception of personal
space. That is to say, the triune relationality enables us to understand the space
between persons, which allows them to be for and from each other in their otherness.
Put differently, personal space allows persons to confer particularity to and receive it
23 See Zizioulas, Being as Communion, pp. 27–35.
24 Hence Gregory Nazianzen’s famous statement in Orationes: ‘No sooner do I consider the
One than I am enlightened by the radiance of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish them
than I am carried back to the One’ (40.41).
25 Zizioulas, God as Communion, p. 41.
26 See Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p. 196.
27 Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 225.
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458 Roland Chia
from each other. ‘Father, Son and Spirit through their shape – the taxis – of their
inseparable relatedness confer particularity and freedom on each other ’.28 This is
important because community or communion should not obliterate the particularity
of persons. The conferring of particularity has to do with allowing the space to be.
We shall explore the idea of sociality and relationality in the next section.
The church as community
If, as Gunton has convincingly argued following the Cappadocians and Zizioulas,
communion is fundamental to understanding the being of God, sociality can be
seen as a transcendental, albeit an open transcendental with numerous possibilities
of application. As Dan Hardy has argued in an important essay, sociality as a
transcendental pertains to the church, the redeemed community, but it can be
extended to all created being.29 The aim of this idea, Hardy explains, ‘is to establish
an element which will justify a true society, and thus to inform the pragmatics of
human society’.30 The fundamental intuition behind the argument is surely correct: to
be a human being is to be created in and for God and with other human beings.
Created sociality is made explicit in ecclesiology, which postulates the church as the
true form of the human being, whose particular character is defined and realized
christologically and pneumatologically. Indeed such a theology of sociality is needed
if ecclesiology is not to fall prey to an ideology that privileges either the one or the
many. Either approach ultimately fails to give a proper account of particularity and
relationality, and consequently of reality as such. However, Gunton distances himself
from Hardy’s terminology because an understanding of communion as being-in-
relation does not make sociality a transcendental, since it ‘leaves unresolved the
question of the relation of human society to the material context within which it takes
shape’.31 Transcendentals, according to Gunton, are ‘those notions which we may
suppose to embody “the necessary notes of being”, in the pre-Kantian sense of
notions which give some way of conceiving what reality truly is, everywhere and
always’.32 However, sociality, for Gunton, has an ideal status, which, although it has
much to contribute to ecclesiology, does not yet meet the requirements of the
transcendental that he sought.
Although the concept of sociality enables us to understand the distinctive
character of personal being, it cannot be applied to everything. While it helps to
28 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p. 110.
29 Daniel Hardy, ‘Created and Redeemed Sociality’, in Gunton and Hardy, On Being the
Church, pp. 21–47.
30 Hardy, ‘Created and Redeemed Sociality’, p. 34.
31 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 223.
32 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 136. The same may be said of the
Coleridgean notion of social contract, to which Gunton alludes with much admiration
(pp. 221–2).
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clarify the social nature of personal being, that is, that both God and man have their
being in their ‘free-relation-in-otherness’, it does not contribute to our understanding
of the non-personal universe which does not have the marks of love and freedom.
The transcendental that we are seeking, Gunton concludes, is not sociality but
relationality:
Relationality is thus the transcendental which allows us to learn something of
what it is to say that all created people and things are marked by their coming
from and returning to God who is himself, in his essential and inmost being, a
being in relation.33
In regard to God, this transcendental functions as a coordinate which points to the
eternal and free relations of the persons in the Godhead in the particularity of their
respective being and act. In the case of creation, this transcendental enables us to see
how persons and things can be qualified because they bear the mark of their triune
Creator. In the ecclesia, this is fleshed out in the concept koinonia where relationality
transcends mere reciprocity and takes the form of creative subordination in
conformity to Christ.
The Greek word koinonia is the basis of the Latin communio, which broadly
means union with, although it does not specify the members of the union, its origin
or purpose. This word, which became the favourite of Christian writers, especially
Paul, can be found in classical literature, notably in Aristotle’s analysis of
friendship. When used to describe the church, koinonia designates both
communion between God and humankind and within humankind. As Yves Congar
has put it:
Its fundamental Christian meaning designates the community of the faithful
with Christ, hence their common participation in Christian ‘goods’; the faith,
the body of Christ (1 Corinthians 10:16), the Spirit (2 Corinthians 13:13), and
finally, the community which Christians constitute on the basis of all these
things: In that they are in community with God they are also in community with
one another (see 1 John 1:3, 6). Thus the communio is seen to be constituted by
the Christian life in its fullest sense.34
The idea of communion could be traced to the doctrine of creation since God has
created the world such that in its otherness it is called to be in relation with its
Creator. The idea is also implicit in theological anthropology since the human
creature is a being in relation, and humankind has its true being in communion.
‘Positively’, Gunton writes, ‘humankind is social kind’. He adds: ‘It is only when
[Adam] can rejoice in the fellowship of one who is a true other-in-relation that he is
33 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 229.
34 See Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer, eds., Mysterium Salutis IV/2, pp. 404–5.
Quoted in Robert Kress, The Church: Communion, Sacrament, Communication (New
York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 35.
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460 Roland Chia
able to transcend the merely individual state that is the denial of human fullness.’35
This trail from creation leads back to ecclesiology. According to the New Testament,
the human community becomes concrete in the church, whose purpose is to be the
medium and realization of communion, ‘with God in the first instance, and with other
people in the second, and as a result of the first’.36
According to Gunton, it was the seventeenth-century Puritan theologian John
Owen who developed an ontology of the church as a community. Noting that the
Reformers failed to develop a theology of community because of their belief that
reformation was enough, Owen sought to develop a conception of the church which
initially depended on Aristotelian categories but later on Cappadocian trinitarian
theology. ‘The result’, Gunton concludes, ‘is that Owen’s definition of the Church is
an echo of their [the Cappadocians’] theology of the Trinity.’37 From the analogy of
the free relations of the persons in the Godhead, Owen developed a conception
of the church as a free voluntary society. Such an ecclesiology is rooted firmly in the
freedom of obedience to the gospel. The relations between persons that make up
the church, Owen maintains, constitute something new because it is the work of the
eschatological Spirit. As such, it is thus ‘vain to imagine that this state can arise
from or have any other formal cause but the joint consent and virtual confederation
of those concerned unto those ends’.38 Owen’s strong emphasis on the church as a
community of free-relating persons and the voluntary nature of its membership has
historical as well as theological grounds. Theologically, such an ecclesiology best
echoes the eternal being of God characterized by the mutual self-giving of the Father,
Son and Holy Spirit.
The church is therefore the concrete community of the last times, called to
‘realise in its life the promised and inaugurated reconciliation of all things’.39 The
concrete nature of the church means that it becomes an echo of the life of
the Godhead – the church points to the creative and recreative presence of God
to the world. The activity of proclamation and the celebration of the sacraments, so
central to ecclesial life, are therefore temporal ways in which the community is
oriented to the being of God. Proclamation brings the church into an encounter with
the Word, while baptism and the Eucharist – the sacraments of incorporation and
communion – cause her to encounter the love of God mediated by the Son and the
Spirit. As an intermediate community, the church must attempt to hold together two
contradictory pulls. On the one hand it is a community rooted in the being of God,
while on the other it remains a highly fallible community on this side of eternity. This
means that the complexities that attend to the relationship between the church and the
world cannot be superficially glossed over. As Gunton has perceptively put it, ‘The
35 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 216.
36 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 217.
37 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 71.
38 John Owen, Works, vol. XVI, p. 26. Quoted by Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 72.
39 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 79.
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walls dividing church from the world are permeable.’40 Nevertheless, we can say that
the church becomes ‘an echo of the life of the Trinity when it is enabled by the Spirit
to order its life to where the reconciliation takes place in time, that is to say, to the
life, death and resurrection of Jesus’.41
Before taking leave of this discussion, we must return to the critique of the
concept of the invisible church, which stems from the platonizing tendencies
in Western ecclesiology since Augustine, alluded to in an earlier section. The
Reformers, together with Wycliff and Hus before them, opposed the idea that the
church is to be identified with the visible institution of the medieval church without
remainder. In so doing they followed Augustine and spoke of the invisible nature of
the church. Their intention then was not to found an invisible church, but rather to
renew the visible one. The old debate between the advocates of an ecclesia invisibilis
and those of the ecclesia visibilis, it is true, is now long out of date. However, the
enduring influence of Platonism in Western theology has made it vulnerable to the
dualism and spiritualism that inspire the distinction between the earthly church and
the heavenly one. The ontology of the church developed on the basis of the doctrine
of the Trinity has led Gunton to conclude that ‘there is no invisible Church – at least
not in the sense in which it has usually been understood – not because the Church is
perfect, but because to be in communion with those who are ordered to Jesus by the
Spirit is to be the Church’.42 The church is visible as a human fellowship and through
its acts of worship, preaching and teaching, prayers and works of mercy as a
community. Although Gunton does not elaborate, the ecclesia visibilis does not
imply that the church can be reduced to empirical description. Although it is a
community rooted in history, psychology and sociology, and thus can be weighed up
and compared with other human communities, the church is also mystery. That is the
meaning and implication of the credo ecclesiam. Thus, in this sense, the church may
be described as at once visible and invisible. Of course there are not two churches,
one visible and one invisible. Neither is the invisible part the essential nature of the
church, with the visible part merely its external form. The church we believe is one,
both visible and invisible (in the sense of ‘hidden’), because it is mystery.
The limits of analogy
By Gunton’s own admission, the analogy of echo (like all analogous predications) is
limited in explicating the being of the church because when concepts predicated of
God are used to refer to creatures limited to space and time, changes in the intension
of the concepts will necessarily result. Karl Barth has defined an analogous concept
as that which when applied to ‘two different objects, designates the same thing in
40 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p. 176.
41 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 79.
42 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 80.
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462 Roland Chia
both but in different ways’.43 Analogy therefore refers to similarities amidst ever-
greater dissimilarities.44 One clear example is the concepts of ‘person’ and
‘communion’, which although significant in developing an ontology of the church
nevertheless cannot be used univocally for God and the church. Thus if the doctrine
of the Trinity represents the first mediation between the triune God and the church,
a second and even a third mediation is needed to guard against a univocity which
would either deify the church or strip God of the divine nature. The second mediation
has to do with the fact that because the church is the creation of the triune God, it
corresponds to God only in a creaturely fashion; and the third refers to the distinction
which must be made between the historical and eschatological being of the church.
The communal life of the church is lived between baptism and consummation,
between the historical reality and the eschatological new creation in which
this communion is completed and perfected. The correspondence between trinitarian
communion and ecclesial communion must seriously take into account this inner
dynamic between the historical minimum and the eschatological maximum that
characterizes the latter. This means that for the sojourning church only a dynamic
understanding of the correspondence with the Trinity is meaningful.45
The dissimilarities that obtain between the communion and relationality of the
trinitarian and ecclesial persons must also be carefully pointed out. Although it is
inconceivable for the trinitarian persons to live apart or in isolation from one another,
the same cannot be said for ecclesial persons. Human beings can live as human
43 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, The Doctrine of God, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F.
Torrance, trans. T.H.L. Parker et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p. 237.
44 The limitations of analogical predications, however, do not undermine the ability of
human language successfully to describe God and, in this case, the church. In Act and
Being (London: SCM Press, 2002), Gunton critiques the via negativa of both the Eastern
and Western theological traditions. The predominance of the negative, as Gunton calls it,
found in John Damascus’ apophatism and Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication,
‘appears to imply that negative attributes are really more true of the being of God than
those described as positive’ (p. 50). Gunton argues that the univocal theory of theological
language, advanced by Duns Scotus, would enable theology to take more seriously the
predicates it uses for God and creatures. It must be pointed out, however, that with this
emphasis, Gunton is not rejecting the analogous nature of theological language. Together
with Scotus, Gunton is simply affirming that the concept of analogy requires an element
of univocity, that is to say, that words used for both God and creature correspond to
attributes which in some sense are common to both. If this is not affirmed, language used
for God and creatures would be equivocal in meaning. For Gunton, as it was for Scotus,
this would mean the dissolution of theology: ‘Unless “being” implies one univocal
intention [i.e., concept], theology would simply perish’ (Duns Scotus, Lectura 1.3.1.1–2,
n. 113). The implication of all this for the present discussion is simply that concepts like
‘person’ and ‘communion’ that are used analogously to describe God and the church say
things which are literally true and univocal about both, despite their obvious limits, so
that it is possible to develop an ontology of the church from the doctrine of the Trinity.
This is because analogy always has an element of univocity.
45 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1998), p. 199.
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beings apart from others or even in hatred toward one another, although it may be
said that they are still in some sense constituted by the other, even the one whom they
hate. Ecclesial persons, it is true, cannot live apart from fellowship with each other
because salvation has an indispensable ecclesial structure. Yet, the difference remains
in that the fellowship between persons in the church is not simply communion as in
the Trinity, but is sustained because of a covenant, and is therefore a communion of
will. Secondly, and this refers to an earlier point, ‘ecclesial communion on this side
of God’s new creation can correspond to the perfect mutual love of the trinitarian
persons only in a broken fashion’.46 Two other general points must be made before
we turn our attention to more specific issues. The first is that we must constantly be
reminded of the fact that our notions of the triune God are not the triune God. The
doctrine of the Trinity is the attempt by theology to fashion a model gleaned and
acquired from salvation history with which we seek to approach the mystery of the
triune God. Thus although the doctrine of the Trinity says something which is true
about the being of God, it cannot comprehend the unfathomable God, who dwells ‘in
unapproachable light’ (1 Tim. 6:16). Secondly, the temptation to define the trinitarian
personhood as pure relationality (persona est ratio) must be resisted, for to conceive
of the persons as so transparent that the ‘I’ of these persons dissolves into relations
is to negate the concept of person itself, in that Father becomes fatherhood, the Son,
sonship and the Spirit, procession.
This brings us to the concept of perichoresis and the significance Gunton
accords to it in his reflection on the ecclesial community. Gunton observes that
relations in the church have often been conceived in terms of the subordination of
one group to another. In order for the ecclesial community to mirror more clearly
the free personal relations which constitute the deity, we must move towards an
ecclesiology of perichoresis, ‘in which there is no permanent structure of
subordination, but in which there are overlapping patterns of relationships’.47
Perichoresis is a concept which aims to describe the dynamic interrelations of the
persons in the Godhead on the one hand, and God’s unified yet diverse interaction
with the world on the other. The concept, according to Gunton, can be ‘understood
to be one which was developed by means of a movement in thought from the
dynamic of the divine involvement in space and time to the implications of such an
involvement for an understanding of the eternal dynamic of deity’.48 Although
perichoresis traditionally refers to the concept of coinherence, Gunton, following
Coleridge, maintains that it also implies that the three dynamically constitute each
other’s beings. Perichoresis therefore suggests a specific kind of relational diversity
which is fundamentally different from the Heraclitean flux in that it is not an aimless
flux but one which has a logos, the logic of its own being in relation. More elegantly,
46 Volf, After Our Likeness, p. 207.
47 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 77.
48 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 163.
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464 Roland Chia
‘God is not God apart from the way in which Father, Son and Spirit in eternity give
to and receive from each other what they essentially are.’49
In what way, then, can the concept of perichoresis, which seeks to describe the
dynamic relations of the three persons in the Godhead, be said to serve as an analogy
for the ecclesial community? The premise for this assertion is theological
anthropology: if human beings are created in the image and likeness of God, then it
is not difficult to conceive of human beings as perichoretic beings in some way. The
same may be generally said of the created order, and Gunton provides as examples
the proposals of physicist Michael Faraday and the conclusions of some modern
physicists. In their book, Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, Ilya
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers declare that ‘[Physics] now recognises that, for an
interaction to be real, the “nature” of the related things must derive from these
relations, while at the same time the relations must derive from the “nature” of
things’.50 Regarding the being-in-relation of human beings, perichoresis affirms that
persons mutually constitute each other. ‘Our particularity in community is the fruit of
our mutual constitutiveness: of a perichoretic being bound up with each other in the
bundle of life.’51 Furthermore, the notion of perichoresis enables us to address both
individualism and collectivism because it presents an understanding of relationality
which does not negate particularity. The broad analogous application of this concept
to the church is not difficult to envisage: as a community brought together by the
Spirit of God the church is made up of Christians who are related to each other in a
way in which they mutually constitute each other.
Although perichoresis enables us to understand the nature of relationality at a
deeper level than non-perichoretic concepts of human beings, it is nonetheless
limited, and therefore serves only as an analogy. The limitation has to do with the
qualitative ontological distinction between God and creation. When applied to
the persons of the triune Godhead, perichoresis implies a ‘total and eternal
interanimation of being and energies’.52 But when used in relation to the created
order, that is, to that which is bound by space and time, changes in the ‘intension of
the concept’ must necessarily follow. There can be no direct correspondence of the
interiority of the divine persons to that of human persons. Human beings being
external to each other cannot be said to indwell one another in the same way as the
divine persons indwell each other. While it is true that human beings can embrace
each other or ‘enter emphatically’ into the other, this must be distinguished from the
perichoretic relationship among the divine persons. At the ecclesial level, only what
Miroslav Volf calls the ‘interiority of personal characteristics’ can correspond to the
interiority of the divine persons.53 In the church there is found through the indwelling
49 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 164.
50 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with
Nature (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 95.
51 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 170.
52 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 170.
53 Volf, After Our Likeness, p. 211.
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of the Spirit among Christians a mutual internalization of personal characteristics, as
each person gives himself or herself to others, and also takes up others into himself
or herself. In this way, the ecclesial human being becomes a catholic person in his or
her uniqueness, mirroring the catholicity of the divine persons.
Two further points must be raised at this juncture. The first is a reminder that it
is not simply the mutual perichoresis of human beings but the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit in individuals and in the church that makes the latter into a communion
corresponding to the Trinity. This point, though in many ways obvious, must be
stressed if ecclesiology is to be totally freed from the grip of secularism. The unity
of the church is thus grounded in the interiority of the Spirit in Christians – and with
the Spirit, in the interiority of the other divine persons. Thus Gunton’s ecclesisology
seeks to give greater emphasis to the church’s constitution by the Spirit: ‘In such a
way we may create fewer self-justifying and historicising links with the past and give
more stress to the arrangements to be constituted by the Spirit.’54 The second point is
best articulated in the following questions: Can the communion of the three persons
in the Trinity serve as a model for inter-ecclesial unity? Can perichoresis, which is
hitherto applied to persons, also help us to understand the relationship between the
‘local churches’?
Although Gunton does not discuss these issues in great detail (as far as I am
aware), it is not impossible to suggest answers to the above questions on the basis of
his proposals regarding relationality and perichoresis. For Gunton, as the above
discussion makes clear, relationality is a transcendental concept which is gleaned
from the being of God and which enables us to understand all of reality. As such, a
concept of relationality which is given shape by the God who is being-in-communion
can serve as a framework within which to reflect upon the inter-ecclesial relationship.
Can the same, however, be said of perichoresis? For Gunton, perichoresis can be
used not just analogically but also transcendentally – to lay to view what he calls
the necessary notes of being.55 Reality therefore is at all levels ‘perichoretic’, a
dynamism of relatedness, and this applies to ecclesial reality, to the relationship not
just of Christians within the church, but also to the relationship between ecclesial
communities. Put differently, the doctrine of the Trinity can provide us with the
coordinates to reflect on the relationship between the local church and the universal
church, and the relationship between local churches. However, the different
trinitarian theologies (between the West and the East, for example) would lead to
different ways in which inter-ecclesial relations are conceived. The priority of the
unity of God in the Western tradition, and its tendency to locate this unity at the level
of substance so that the one substance of God takes precedence over the triplicity of
persons, has meant that the one universal church has precedence over the many local
churches. If the unity of substance in God is that which ‘sustains’ the triplicity of the
persons, it follows that the local churches are churches in the fullest sense only in so
far as they exist from and toward the whole. As Hermenegild Biedermann puts it,
54 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 62.
55 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 165.
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466 Roland Chia
‘Just as the unity of the one divine nature and essence as it were “sustains” the
triplicity of persons, so also does a universal church as the common foundation
“sustain” the multiplicity of local churches.’56
By giving priority to the persons-in-relation rather than to the divine substance,
Gunton’s conception of the Trinity, as we have seen, is closer to the Eastern tradition
(especially the Cappadocians and Zizioulas) than to Western formulations. The one
substance of God does not enjoy ontological priority over the persons. Rather the
reverse is the case: because God’s being coincides with personhood, the divine
substance exists only as persons. On this basis, it is possible to draw a trajectory of
thought that would lead to certain conclusions regarding the relationship between the
local church and the universal church – which roughly parallels Zizioulas’ position.
If the one divine substance has no priority over the persons, then, by analogy, the
universal church has no priority over the local churches. That is to say, there is
no universal church behind the local churches, just as there is no substance behind
the three divine persons. This means that every local church is the universal church,
just as every person in the Trinity is God. But in order for the local church to be
identical to the universal church it must be in communion with other local churches.
For Zizioulas the catholicity of the local church is grounded on the eucharistic
presence of the whole Christ, who incorporates the many to himself. The
eucharistic communion is, for Zizioulas, the ‘expression par excellence of
the catholicity of the church, a catholic act of the catholic church’.57
While this line of argument is attractive, one wonders if Gunton would leave
the simple analogy of divine substance = universal church and divine persons =
local church assumed in Zizioulas’ (and the Western tradition’s) formulation
unchallenged. In the case of the Western tradition, such an analogy has led to the idea
of the one divine substance existing in addition to the divine persons. But in the
case of Zizioulas and the Eastern tradition, we have the converse problem of how to
distinguish between the divine persons if each of them has the one divine nature. For
Gunton, the answer must lie once again in perichoresis: the point of departure should
not be the relationship between the divine nature and the divine persons but rather the
relationship of the divine persons as such. If the unity of the being of God must be
understood perichoretically, so must the unity of the church. It is by opening up to
one another diachronically and synchronically that local churches – which are
always creatures limited by space and time – enrich one another, and thus become
increasingly catholic, corresponding to the catholicity of the triune God. The
universal church cannot simply be identified with the local church because the
former is an eschatological reality. It is more accurate to say that local churches
56 Hermenegild Biedermann, ‘Gotteslehre und Kirchenverständnis: Zugang der orthodoxen
und der katholischen Theologie’, Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift 129 (1981),
pp. 131–42, p. 138.
57 John Zizioulas, ‘Les groupes informels dans l’Eglise: Un point de vue orthodoxe’, in
R. Metz and J. Schlick, eds., Les groupes informels dans l’Eglise, Hommes et église 2
(Strasbourg: Cerdic, 1971), pp. 252–72. Quoted in Volf, After Our Likeness, p. 104.
Trinity and Ontology: Colin Gunton’s Ecclesiology 467
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Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
are historical anticipations of the eschatological people of God, that is, the
eschatological universal church.
The final issue that must be discussed has to do with the problem concerning the
relation between community and institution in ecclesiology. Gunton’s approach
clearly seeks to de-emphasize hierarchy and what he calls the over-realized
eschatology of the institution in modern ecclesiology. Yet the fact that the church as
an earthly community bears the structures of such communities, which include
hierarchy and institution, cannot be denied. How are we then to understand them in
relation to the communal nature of the church that mirrors the being of the triune
God? It is clear that Gunton rejects a hierarchical model of the Trinity associated
chiefly with the third-century theologian Origen. Nor is he entirely at ease with the
monarchical view of the Father proposed by Zizioulas and the Eastern theologians.
If, as Gunton has emphatically argued, the church is fundamentally a community,
then its hierarchical structure is of secondary importance. The problem with modern
ecclesiology is that it construes relations in terms of ‘permanent subordination of one
group to another, even though the superordinate group has for the sake of
appearances dignified its position with the rhetoric of “service” ’.58 The ecclesiology
of perichoresis that Gunton proposes envisions rather overlapping patterns of
relationships where there is no permanent structure of subordination. Thus, ‘the same
person will be sometimes “sub-ordinate” and sometimes “superordinate” according
to the gifts and graces being exercised’.59 What of the relationship between
community and institution? Gunton would doubtless agree with Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
who wrote:
The whole interpretation of the organisational forms of the Protestant Church as
being those of an institution must therefore be dismissed as erroneous. It is only
by beginning with the church as a community of persons that the Protestant
forms of baptism, confirmation, withdrawal, gatherings of the congregation and
church rules can be understood; only from this standpoint can one understand
the structure of the objective spirit of the church, as it is embodied in fixed
forms.60
58 Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 77.
59 By his own admission, this concept may be thought of as ‘hopelessly idealistic’. See
Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth’, p. 77.
60 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio (London: Collins, 1963), p. 178.
English translation © The author 2007
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
468 Roland Chia