The year is 4000AD
Someone very well respected from 2013 once said
' I do not permit a woman to be a policeman'. And we are trying to understand and apply such a command.
Looking through various uses we come up with a general definition
'A
policeman is someone who enforces the law with authority'.
It works for
all cases so everything looks good. And perhaps we have come to call in
our culture all instances of law enforcement and the legal process 'policing'
But then we come to historical cases of women (affirmed by our writer) being lawyers and judges.
We
provisionally accept that women may do some kind of activity called
'lawyering' or 'judging', but because of our general definition of
'policeman', whatever they were doing couldn't be enforcing the law
(perhaps they were only defence lawyers, or perhaps they were just
commenting but with no authority).
The more conservative among us
would also question whether a wife who questioned her husband at home
was in some way acting as a policeman, after all, they were attempting
to enforce a code, with some kind of authority.
So a historian
comes along and says, "hey wait a minute, when this person was writing,
police had batons and guns to enforce the law, they walked and drove the streets trying to keep peace, and involved themselves
in investigation, in fact context seems to suggest that our writer was
speaking specifically of cops on the beat. Perhaps we could allow women
some involvement in court prosecutions, deliberation and even
investigation."
But his critics reply, "no, no, we all know what
'policing' means, it means 'enforcing the law with authority'. That
definition works in every case. It simply does not matter that you can
show copious historical evidence that the practice of policing at that
time primarily involved getting on the street and investigating crime. I
can even show you some historical evidence of police going into a
courtroom, and some other evidence of police directing questions to
someone who is accused, the very things you want women to now do as
'lawyers' and 'judges'. I'm afraid this is simply because you want to
evade the text. You haven't even addressed WHY a woman couldn't be a policeman, which as we all know is about her having authority."
HT Luke for the converation that brought this up for me
Monday, March 4, 2013
Friday, March 1, 2013
Why I don't think Lionel Windsor has nailed John Dickson, and the worrying approach to language that comes from his reply.
In John Dickson's 'Hearing Her Voice',
John puts forward a particular understanding of what Paul means by
'didaskein' in 1 Timothy 2. Lionel Windsor has responded to John's
claims. I have said elsewhere that I (and others, including John) are
still waiting for someone to do the work on a proper critique. Some
have asked why Lionel's critique isn't 'proper'.
This is a debate about the meaning of a
particular use of a particular word, so it is interesting to contrast
the linguistic approaches of John and Lionel.
- Lionel seems to think that words have a 'general' meaning, and perhaps a more 'technical' meaning, and that the general meaning can be assumed until otherwise disproved.
This is a false approach to language.
Words do not have a 'core' or 'general' meaning. Words simply mean
whatever they mean when they are used. Different contexts, registers,
different places in sentences, different combinations of words show
different meanings for the same bunch of letters.
So, the word 'set' can mean a complete
collection
the word 'set' can mean the hardening
of concrete
the word 'set' can mean a unit of games
in tennis
the word 'set' can mean to place down
None of these are 'general' or
'technical', they are simply available meanings.
Where words are set within a given set
sets their meaning. Game ,set and match Dickson.
Everyone has the burden of proof when
the meaning of a word is contested.
But where will this proof and evidence
come from?
- Dickson looks for his evidence internally to the Pastoral letters of Paul. How is didaskw used in these letters?He then correlates his findings to external historical evidence to practices in the first century
Lionel Windsor on the other hand
appeals to conceptual analysis of a translated gloss. That is, he is
asking philosophical questions about a 'concept' in English, 'teach'.
This is the lexicographical equivalent of allegory. It can sound
quite profound, and can even bring some insight, but struggles to
find objective controls. Whatever may be conceptually said about the
concept can be transferred back into the source language, or made the
chief emphasis. Lionel goes for a relational dynamic of authority for
'teach', but it could as easily be.. 'all teaching requires the
breathing out of truth.. breathing is the essential part of teaching
and therefore didaskw.
- But conceptual analysis shouldn't be thrown away altogether. There is at least one control in this debate, and that is the way Paul uses other terms about speaking (or breathing out!) truthful statements about Jesus. That is the importance of lexical choice. Now, we shouldn't be fooled into thinking that every time a writer uses a different lexeme they must have a completely distinct concept in mind. Sometimes we use different words simply for variety. But in the conceptual framework of a writer, if they say forbid 'x', but explicitly encourage 'y' and 'z', we would expect ther to be some significant difference between x and (yz). This is exactly the case for Paul, who forbids 'teaching' but encourages 'prophesying and exhorting' for women.John's definition makes the difference quite clear by positing 'teach ' as a particular office of handing down the apostolic deposit (an office largely taken by our written Gospels)I don't think Lionel's definition of 'relational dynamics involving authority' makes a clear enough difference between 'teach', 'prophesy' and 'exhort' to make any sense of Paul (unless we say that Paul is incoherent, not somewhere I am going). Is there no authority in prophesying? Is there no authority in exhorting? This is particularly distressing for those of us who see authority lying in Scripture, and why Lionel's position, though in theory allows women to speak with a church service, actually allows them no place..lest God exercise his authority through them. (and indeed, why restrict oneself to the church service, or even the church, if what Paul is disallowing is a 'general' conveying of truth within a relationship of authority.... ie taking the definition to it's extremes (which Lionel doesn't), if a female expert in Art History tells me the truth about a painting, and knows more than me, then she is breaking Paul's command)That is, because Lionel is unwilling to the historical work of asking 'What relationship?' 'What Authority?' of the text in Timothy, it can be expanded to any and every relationship and authority.
So, there you have my reasons. Jury is
still out for me re the whole passage, we still havn't touched on
'authentein'. Nevertheless, I'm still waiting for someone to do a
proper job on Dickson's work
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